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In November 2013, after a series of Law Commission reports and years of academic, 
professional and judicial discussion, the government introduced legislation to 
Parliament to replace the existing High Court commercial list with a specialist 
commercial panel. Whilst this panel would bring New Zealand into line with many 
comparable common law jurisdictions, this paper argues that the case for 
specialisation has not been established. In particular, it notes that there is no 
publically available evidence to support the claim that the High Court is losing its 
commercial jurisdiction, or that commercial parties are choosing to resolve their 
disputes offshore or through alternative dispute resolution. Accordingly, this paper 
argues that future research by the Law Commission, or other research agency, is 
required before specialisation can be justified. In reaching this conclusion it also 
examines the issues that may arise if the government decides to continue with its 
proposed reform under clause 18 of the Judicature Modernisation Bill 2013, 
suggesting changes along the way. 
 
Key topics: Judicial specialisation, High Court, Alternative Dispute Resolution, 
Commercial Litigation. 
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I Introduction 
 
Judicial specialisation is a vexed, complicated, and highly contentious issue. On the 
one hand, several experienced practitioners have strongly advocated moving towards 
increased High Court specialisation. On the other hand, many of the senior courts’ 
judges have rallied against this proposal, vigorously defending their right to exercise 
all of the High Court’s jurisdiction regardless of their pre-bench experience. 
Unfortunately, much of the debate has centred on perception and intuition, rather than 
empirical analysis. The purpose of this paper is to place the dispute in context, 
providing a thorough discussion of the contentious issues involved.  
 
Beginning with an analysis of the perceived problem, this paper notes that 
practitioners’ concerns with the current system are multi-faceted, ranging from the 
judiciary’s ability to develop New Zealand’s commercial law to the rising use of 
alternative dispute resolution (ADR). Whilst these concerns are frequently cited, 
practitioners fail to provide concrete evidence to support their contentions. Nor, as 
this paper reveals, does this evidence exist. As a result, this paper suggests the future 
steps which law reform bodies such as the Law Commission or the Ministry of Justice 
should take. 
 
Assuming that further research confirms practitioners’ concerns with the current 
system, this paper considers other countries’ use of specialist courts and judges, 
observing that commercial specialisation is present in both large and small 
jurisdictions. This paper then briefly considers the potential effects specialisation may 
have within New Zealand, before addressing the numerous concerns with the 
government’s current proposals for reform in the Judicature Modernisation Bill 2013. 
 
II The perceived problem 
 
For New Zealand’s civil justice system to flourish, it must enjoy the commercial 
community’s confidence and respect. Decisions need to accord with business common 
sense, and the standard of judicial reasoning must be high.1 If not, parties will seek to 
                                               
1 Alan Galbraith “Facilitating and Regulating Commerce – The Court Process” (2002) 33 VUWLR 419 
at 422; Ivor Richardson “What Can Commercial Lawyers Expect of a Legal System?” (1998) 4 
NZBLQ 128 at 133; and John Katz “Access to Justice from the Perspective of the Commercial 
Community: Judicial Specialisation” (2012) 18 Auckland U L Rev 37 at 38. See also Robert Goff 
“Commercial Contracts and the Commercial Court” [1984] LMCLQ 382 at 382 where his Lordship 
famously stated that “[Judges] are there to help businessmen, not to hinder them: we are there to give 
effect to their transactions, not frustrate them: we are there to oil the wheels of commerce, not to put a 
spanner in the works, or even grit in the oil.” 
 WILLIAM STEEL – LAWS 522 
 6 
resolve their disputes elsewhere, depriving High Court judges of the opportunity to 
shape and develop New Zealand’s commercial law. 
 
Unfortunately, if one is to believe the writings of several critics, New Zealand’s lack 
of High Court specialisation represents an “acute problem”, 2  posing a significant 
threat to the commercial community’s “access to justice”. 3  Their views, and the 
alleged consequences of this lack of specialisation, are outlined below. 
A The underlying issues 
 
Underpinning several practitioners’ (and some judges’) concerns with the current 
system is the belief that generalist judges may be unable to grasp the factual and legal 
nuances of many commercial disputes, leading to inadequate decisions and unwanted 
appeals. 
1 Failure to identify the correct facts 
 
One of the main problems associated with the High Court’s lack of commercial 
specialisation is the risk of trial court judges making incorrect findings of fact. Under 
New Zealand’s common law system, appellate courts almost always defer to the High 
Court judge’s impression of witnesses and decisions based on the evidence placed 
before him or her.4 Accordingly, litigants must be confident of the generalist judge’s 
ability to draw the correct inferences from the evidence placed before the Court, 
otherwise they will begin to look elsewhere.5  
 
This is particularly important in highly technical fact-based areas of the law.6 Take, 
for example, a complex multilateral finance or intellectual property dispute.7 In many 
                                               
2 Tony Molloy and Toby Graham “Trust Jurisdictions: the Path from Incipience to Refulgence” (2010) 
16 Trusts & Trustees 116 at 120. 
3 Katz, above n 1, at 41. 
4 Rae v International Insurance Brokers (Nelson Marlborough) Ltd [1998] 3 NZLR 190 (CA) at 198. 
See also Viscount Haldane LC’s statement in Nocton v Lord Ashburton [1914] AC 932 (HL) at 957 “… 
it is only in exceptional circumstances that judges of appeal, who have not seen the witness in the box, 
ought to differ from the finding of fact of the judge who tried the case as to the state of mind of the 
witness.” (emphasis added). 
5  Katz, above n 1, at 41. 
6 See, for example, Michael R Baye and Joshua D Wright “Is Antitrust Too Complicated for Generalist 
Judges? The Impact of Economic Complexity and Judicial Training on Appeals” (2011) 54 Journal of 
Law and Economics 1 at 4; and Richard A Posner “The Law and Economics of the Economic Expert 
Witness” (1999) 13 Journal of Economic Perspectives 91 at 96 “… econometrics is such a difficult 
subject that it is unrealistic to expect the average judge or juror to be able to understand all the 
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situations, these cases will be won or lost depending on whether the judge understands 
the evidence in dispute.8 Yet, what an expert considers to be “everyday bread and 
butter … may well be a minefield” for a non-specialist judge.9  
 
The result, according to critics, is that generalist judges may feel the need to take 
‘crash’ courses at university, or request additional background information from 
counsel or expert witnesses.10 But in both situations, trials are likely to become more 
drawn out, and hence, more expensive.11 This is neither fair on the judges, “who may 
have no aptitude or interest in the topic”,12 nor the parties, who bear the expense of 
educating the judge.13 More worryingly, as Baragwanath J argued extra-judicially, it 
is a breach of “natural justice” if judges fail to understand the case pre-trial, leaving 
them incapable of “[posing] questions to witnesses and counsel during the hearing.”14  
 
This is not an idle concern for many practitioners. Whereas appellate courts will 
readily overturn a trial court judge’s incorrect application of the law, they “will not 
reverse a factual finding unless compelling grounds are shown for doing so.”15 The 
option to appeal, therefore, may be of cold comfort to those litigants whose issue is 
with the judge’s findings of fact, rather than his or her application of the law. 
                                                                                                                                      
criticisms of an econometric study, no matter how skilful the econometrician is in explaining a study to 
a lay audience.” 
7 For a detailed discussion of these disputes in the New Zealand context see Susan Glazebrook “A 
Specialist Patent or Intellectual Property Court for New Zealand” (2005) 33 JWIP 524; David 
Baragwanath “How Should We Resolve Disputes in Complex International Financing Transactions?” 
(2012) 7 CMLJ 204; and Jonathan Ross “The case for P.R.I.M.E. Finance: P.R.I.M.E. Finance cases” 
(2012) 7 CMLJ 221. 
8 See Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia “Submission to the Advisory Council on 
Intellectual Property in response to its Issues Paper Post-Grant Patent Enforcement Strategies” (May 
2007) <www.ipria.org>. Cited with approval by Glazebrook, above n 7, at 540. 
9 Katz, above n 1, at 41. This is not a new phenomenon. For example, in 1911, Learned Hand J stated 
that: “I cannot stop without calling attention to the extraordinary condition of the law which makes it 
possible for a man without any knowledge of even the rudiments of chemistry to pass upon such 
questions are these … How long shall we continue to blunder along …?” see Parke-Davis & Co v H K 
Mulford & Co 189 F 95, 115 (SDNY, 1911). 
10 See, for example, the House of Lords’ decision to attend a 2-day chemistry seminar at Oxford 
University in Kirin-Amgen Inc v Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd [2005] 1 All ER 667 (HL) at [135]. 
11 For example, Baragwanath, above n 7, at 210; Glazebrook, above n 7, at 537; and Richard Southwell 
“A Specialist Commercial Court in Singapore” (1990) 2 SAc LJ 274 at 275. See also Katz, above n 1, 
at 39. 
12 Baragwanath, above n 7, at 210. 
13 For example, Baragwanath, above n 7, at 210. 
14 Baragwanath, above n 7, at 211. 
15 Rae v International Insurance Brokers (Nelson Marlborough) Ltd, above n 4, at 198 per Tipping J. 
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2 Incorrect application of the law 
 
Nevertheless, the generalist judge’s (in)ability to make correct findings of fact forms 
only part of the problem according to critics of the current system. If the resulting 
judgment fails to accord with business common sense, or lacks detailed reasons for its 
conclusion, commercial parties are unlikely to view the domestic courts with 
confidence.16 
 
Unfortunately, critics routinely identify generalist decisions that are said to fail this 
basic standard.17 For example, in 2011, a dispute regarding the interpretation of a 
bond, entered into between the parties pursuant to a ship-building contract, was 
appealed from the English Commercial Court to the Court of Appeal. At stake was a 
claim worth US$46,620,000 plus interest.18 With Patten LJ and Sir Simon Tuckey 
coming to different conclusions, Lord Justice Thorpe had the casting vote. In a one 
paragraph opinion, Thorpe LJ (a family court judge) commenced his reasoning as 
follows:19 
 
I find myself in the invidious position of expressing a decisive opinion in a field 
that is completely foreign. With considerable trepidation I support the judgment 
of Patten LJ … 
 
Clearly, this statement is unlikely to engender confidence in the judiciary.20 Indeed, 
the case’s subsequent progression to the United Kingdom’s Supreme Court further 
reinforced many practitioners’ perception of non-specialist judges being unsuitable for 
deciding commercial disputes. Delivering the Court’s unanimous judgment, Lord 
                                               
16 See generally Galbraith, above n 1. 
17 For example, Galbraith, above n 1, at 427 trenchantly criticised the Court of Appeal’s decision in 
Benjamin Developments v Jones [1994] 3 NZLR 189 (CA) stating that “[the] case illustrates that the 
judges that made up that particular Court of Appeal were not prepared to subsume their view to that of 
market participants. In my opinion, they were wrong. Whatever expertise the members of that court had 
in commercial law is not the same as the expertise or experience that the market participants had in the 
actual marketplace …”. See also Tony Molloy “New Zealand: Cuckoos in the nest in an otherwise 
promising trust and investment jurisdiction” 201 Offshore Investment 19 at 21 who comments on a 
series of “silly decisions” in New Zealand trust law. 
18 Rainy Sky v Kookmin Bank [2009] EWHC 2624 (Comm) at [1]. 
19 Rainy Sky v Kookmin Bank at [2010] EWCA Civ 582 at [53]. 
20  For example, Mark Humphries, former head of advocacy at Linklaters in London, noted in 
“Choosing the Right Judges” (7 July 2011) Law Society Gazette <www.lawgazette.co.uk> “… can it 
be right that an appeal from a Commercial Court judgment is ultimately decided by a judge whose 
expertise is largely confined to family law? … At the very least, the public is entitled to expect that the 
law will be administered by those who have sufficient expertise.”  
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Clarke dramatically overturned the Court of Appeal’s decision, stating that it led to a 
“surprising and uncommercial result”21 and “defies commercial common sense.”22  
 
Admittedly, this example involves an appellate, rather than a trial, court decision from 
a different jurisdiction. Nevertheless, it provides a stark example of a judge who is out 
of his depth. And it is this risk which causes significant concern amongst senior 
practitioners.23  
 
Significantly, this unease is not unique to barristers and their clients. Indeed, it is a 
view often shared by judges. 24  In 2009, New Zealand’s Attorney-General, Chris 
Finlayson, recounted Sir Hugh Laddie’s experience as an English High Court judge as 
persuading him that increased judicial specialisation was required. 25  In 2005, Sir 
Hugh Laddie took the almost unprecedented step of resigning his judicial 
commission. His reasons for doing so were illuminating. Amongst other ‘gripes’,26 he 
expressed serious concern at the prospect of hearing cases outside his experience, 
stating that “it was challenging – like high wire walking – but I didn’t think it was fair 
for clients to be learning at their expense.”27 As Finlayson noted:28 
 
… this made me think that if someone like Sir Hugh [whom he had previously 
described as being ‘one of the most impressive lawyers I have ever met’] could 
be lost to the bench due to his fear he lacked experience in some areas, then we 
have to ask ourselves ‘what about others?’  
 
Finally, there is a widespread view that specialisation at the bar should result in 
specialisation at the bench.29 Since at least 1978, lawyers have become increasingly 
specialised, often advertising themselves to potential clients on the basis of their 
                                               
21 Rainy Sky v Kookmin Bank [2011] UKSC 50, [2011] 1 WLR 2900 at [17]. 
22 Rainy Sky v Kookmin Bank [2011] UKSC 50, [2011] 1 WLR 2900 at [41] and [45]. 
23 See, for example, Baragwanath, above n 7, at 210; Katz, above n 1, at 41; Molloy, above n 17, at 21; 
and Humphries, above n 20. 
24 See, for instance, Warren Burger’s statements in ‘Using Arbitration to Achieve Justice (1985) 50 Arb 
J 3 at 6. See also David Williams QC, former High Court Judge, who observed that “the commercial 
community [in New Zealand] is bailing out of civil litigation [because of] … ‘continuing long run 
unhappiness’ with the [apparent] refusal to let judges specialise in either commercial or criminal 
matters” cited by Molloy, above n 17, at 22. 
25 Chris Finlayson, Attorney-General of New Zealand, “Access to Justice, Legal Representation and the 
Rule of Law” (speech to the Legal Research Foundation, 23 October 2009). 
26 In particular, “[he] blamed a lack of stimulation [and] the isolation of the job”. See “Obituary of 
Professor Sir Hugh Laddie” The Telegraph (online ed, London, 3 December 2008). 
27 “Obituary of Professor Sir Hugh Laddie” The Telegraph (online ed, London, 3 December 2008). 
28 Finlayson, above n 25. 
29 For example Katz, above n 1, at 39; and Galbraith, above n 1, at 423. 
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expertise, or knowledge of a particular area of the law.30  Indeed, the notion that 
lawyers cannot be expected to be experts in all areas of the law has now been codified 
in the Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care Rules 2008.31  As critics emphasise, if 
commercial parties do not expect lawyers to be generalists, how can they expect 
judges to become experts in the multitude of cases that come before them?32  
B How is this a problem? 
 
A lack of judicial specialisation does not pose a direct threat to New Zealand’s 
judicial system. Taken as a whole, the number of wayward decisions by generalist 
judges is likely to be a relatively small percentage of the overall number of High 
Court decisions. Instead, the damage, according to critics, comes from the reluctance 
of many businesses to take the (albeit low) risk of a generalist judge coming to the 
‘wrong’ legal conclusion, or making incorrect findings of fact.  
 
This poses a substantial threat because, as a common law jurisdiction, New Zealand 
depends upon a steady flow of litigation to develop, refine and adapt its commercial 
law. 33  According to its detractors, the lack of specialisation threatens this 
development, as commercial parties choose to resolve their disputes offshore, or 
through ADR.34 
                                               
30 Beattie and others Report of the Royal Commission on the Courts (Government Printer, Wellington, 
1978) [Report of the Royal Commission on the Courts] at [313]. Indeed, specialisation has been an 
issue since at least 1968. See Public and Administrative Law Reform Committee Appeals from 
Administrative Tribunals - First Report (Government Printer, Wellington, 1968) 
31 Indeed, r 4.1 of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008 
clearly accepts that lawyers cannot be expected to work in all areas of the law, stating that good cause 
for refusing a request to act includes situations where the “instructions [fall] outside the lawyer's 
normal field of practice”. 
32 For example Katz, above n 1, at 39; and Galbraith, above n 1, at 423. See also the New Zealand Bar 
Association’s submission to the Law Commission, which observed that “[s]pecialisation in one form or 
another is a reality in the modern practice of law and has been for some time now. It is an issue of 
relevance, not just for legal practitioners and their clients, but also the judiciary.” Cited in Law 
Commission Review of the Judicature Act 1908: Towards a Consolidated Courts Act (NZLC IP29, 
2012) [Law Commission 2012 Issues Paper]. For a contrasting view, see Susy Frankel “Commentary 
on the Conference Session ‘Regulating and Facilitating Commerce’” (2002) 33 VUWLR 813 at 816. 
33 See generally Helen Winkelmann, Chief High Court Judge of New Zealand, “ADR and the Civil 
Justice System” (speech to the Arbitrators’ and Mediators’ Institute of New Zealand, Auckland, 6 
August 2011) at 2. 
34 Indeed, the New Zealand Law Society recently expressed “[concern] about the prospect of the law 
not being developed and articulated as fully as it might be because of a decline in judgments in 
commercial cases. This is an issue that is important to the commercial community.” See Law 
Commission Review of the Judicature Act 1908: Towards a New Courts Act (NZLC R126, 2012) [Law 
Commission 2012 Review of the Judicature Act 1908] at [10.38]. 
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1 Increasing use of ADR 
 
Defined broadly, ADR refers to all methods of resolving a dispute other than by 
recourse to litigation. Whilst this includes processes such as negotiation, conciliation 
and mini-trials,35 practitioners have emphasised the (perceived) link between a lack of 
judicial specialisation, and the rise of arbitration and mediation.  
 
As a form of ‘private litigation’, arbitration (typically) involves a series of adversarial 
hearings before one (or more) party appointed arbitrators, resulting in a binding 
arbitral award.36 Although it offers many potential advantages over litigation, “often 
the factor which tips the choice towards arbitration”, according to Alan Galbraith QC, 
“is the ability of the parties to select the arbitrator.”37 Given the choice between an 
experienced arbitrator, and the possibility of a judge who “[finds himself] in the 
invidious position of expressing a decisive opinion in a field that is completely 
foreign”,38 it is easy to see why commercial parties (allegedly) opt for arbitration. As 
Warren Burger, former United States Chief Justice, observed:39 
 
My own experience persuades me that in terms of cost, time, and human wear 
and tear, arbitration is vastly better than conventional litigation for many kinds of 
cases … I emphasize this because to find precisely the judge whose talents and 
experience fit a particular case of great complexity is a fortuitous circumstance. 
This can be made more likely if two intelligent litigants agree to pick their own 
triers of the issues. 
 
Whilst it is clear that a lack of specialisation provides strong justification for 
arbitration’s growth, one may argue that it provides little support for mediation’s 
popularity. To a certain extent this is true. The choice of a mediator is arguably not as 
important for parties entering into a non-binding process. If the parties cannot find a 
consensus, they are free to walk away. However, according to practitioners, this 
simplistic reasoning fails to recognise that an unsuccessful mediation will almost 
inevitably result in litigation. 
 
As Sir Ivor Richardson wrote, “[j]ustice may be priceless, but it is not costless.”40 The 
risk to parties (however misguided) from potential future costs in terms of time, 
                                               
35 David Spencer Principles of Dispute Resolution (Thompson Reuters, Sydney, 2011) at 2. 
36 Commercial Law in New Zealand (online looseleaf ed, LexisNexis) at [45.3.1]. 
37 Galbraith, above n 1, at 421.  
38 Rainy Sky v Kookmin Bank [2010] EWCA Civ 582 at [53].  
38 Ivor Richardson “Law and Economics” (1998) 4 NZBLQ 64 at 64. 
39 Burger, above n 24, at 6. 
40 Richardson, above n 38, at 64. 
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expense and appeals resulting from inadequate judicial reasoning forms the backdrop 
to mediation.41 As a result, it is suggested that parties face an added impetus to settle 
upon terms of their choosing, with the help of a specialist mediator, rather than risk 
the (albeit low) potential vagaries of a generalist judge.42  
 
This (perceived) loss of commercial litigation has serious consequences for New 
Zealand’s economy, and justice system. If ADR’s popularity continues to grow, 
courts are likely to be faced with fewer civil suits, and less ability to shape future 
law.43 Indeed, the New Zealand Law Society recently expressed concern “about the 
prospect of the law not being developed and articulated as fully as it might be because 
of a decline in judgments in commercial cases.”44  
 
This loss of litigation has the further potential to threaten New Zealand’s economic 
growth. Businesses and business people value “stability of legal relations and the 
ability to plan for the future with confidence.”45 If the underlying legal position is 
unclear, businesses may be forced to engage in lengthy contractual negotiations in an 
attempt to limit their litigation risk, or may simply choose not to enter the market.46 In 
either situation, the lack of certainty (created by the lack of litigation) introduces 
unwanted, and undesirable flow-on effects throughout the economy.  
 
Finally, ADR’s popularity may also prove its downfall. Because ADR relies upon 
court decisions to provide the background legal position, it may struggle to cope with 
                                               
41 See Susan Corbett “Mediation of Intellectual Property Disputes: A Critical Analysis” (2011) 17 
NZBLQ 51 at 62. 
42 As the Law Commission recently noted “how things present themselves to the business sector is an 
important intangible element. And there can be little doubt, given the worldwide acceptance of its 
importance in many jurisdictions, that the actual “availability” – regardless of the numerical impact – 
of a commercial court or panel is perceived to be of some moment. It is a confidence factor in a 
particular jurisdiction that is not easily quantified.” Law Commission 2012 Review of the Judicature 
Act 1908, above n 34, at [10.60] (emphasis added). 
43 This is not an idle concern. In relation to a dwindling number of construction cases, Canada’s Chief 
Justice noted that: “The construction law tree looks different than it used to. It may not be dead, but 
new branches are not appearing as often as they once did. And old branches that need pruning are being 
neglected.” Beverly McLachlin “Judging the ‘Vanishing Trial’ in the Construction Industry” (2010) 5 
CLInt 9 at 10. For a New Zealand perspective see Winkelmann, above n 33. 
44 Law Commission 2012 Review of the Judicature Act 1908, above n 34, at [10.39]. 
45 Roger Kerr “Commerce, Certainty and the Courts” [1997] NZLJ 361 at 363. See also Richardson, 
above n 1, at 129 and 133. 
46 For an example of parties “negotiating in a fog” of legal uncertainty, leading to protracted and costly 
negotiations see Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Clear Communications Ltd [1995] 1 
NZLR 385 (PC). Quote from Clear Communications Ltd v Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd 
(1992) 5 TCLR 166 (HC) at 219. 
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new developments if there have been no judicial decisions in the area.47 The result, 
ironically, is that ADR may become uncertain, providing an additional threat to 
business confidence.48 
2 Offshore litigation 
 
Unfortunately, practitioners have emphasised that ADR is not the only threat to New 
Zealand’s commercial litigation. In an increasingly globalised world, New Zealand 
businesses will often contract with offshore entities, leading to negotiations on a 
choice of forum clause. The problem, in this regard, as Sir Ivor Richardson observed, 
is that “[the] legal procedures of the jurisdiction, including the quality of lawyers and 
judges will influence forum selection as much as the substantive law.”49 
 
Whilst New Zealand undoubtedly has a solid legal system, it is clear that some of our 
most substantial disputes are now being resolved offshore, under different 
jurisdictions.50 Part of the reason appears to be a lack of judicial specialisation.  
 
In 2010, a leading international journal, Trusts & Trustees, whose editorial board 
includes figures such as Lord Millett, Sir Gavin Lightman and Dr Donovan Waters 
QC, commissioned an issue on emerging trust jurisdictions, including China, Cyprus, 
Malta, Russia and, pertinently, New Zealand.51 The accompanying editorial does not 
make for pleasant reading. In the editors’ view: 52 
 
[T]he acute problem besetting [New Zealand] is a lack of judicial specialization, 
combined with a high proportion of judges … whose judicial utterances display a 
serious ineptitude for equity and trust matters. 
                                               
47  See, for instance, James Allsop “International Commercial Law, Maritime Law and Dispute 
Resolution: The Place of Australia, New Zealand and the Asia Pacific Region in the Coming Years” 
(2007) 21 ANZ Mar LJ 1 at 10. 
48 See Law Commission 2012 Review of the Judicature Act 1908, above n 34, at [10.61]: “Part of the 
strategy of the present New Zealand administration is to encourage a growing and vibrant economy. 
Commercial disputes are necessarily part of any such regime. Efficient and adequate dispute resolution 
mechanisms are an important support mechanism. So is ‘certainty’ in commercial law. That can only 
be supplied by the courts. Mediators and arbitrators need to know what the current legal context is in 
which to assess matters which come before them. In that sense, in-court and out-of-court dispute 
mechanisms are complementary.” (emphasis added). 
49 Richardson, above n 1, at 132 (emphasis added). 
50 For two examples of large commercial disputes that were resolved outside New Zealand’s courts see 
Danone Asia Pacific Holdings Pte Ltd v Fonterra Co-Operative Group Ltd [2014] NZHC 1681; and 
Ironsands Investments Ltd v Toward Industries Ltd [2012] NZHC 1277. 
51 Molloy and Graham, above n 2. 
52 Molloy and Graham, above n 2, at 120. 
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Admittedly, this particular editorial was jointly written by Tony Molloy QC, an 
outspoken critic of New Zealand’s generalist system.53 Nonetheless, statements such 
as these represent a significant threat to New Zealand’s legal system. If such 
criticisms become well known, then offshore parties may become more insistent when 
negotiating choice of forum clauses.54 To the extent this occurs, New Zealand stands 
to lose some of its most significant litigation, with a consequent inability to shape and 
develop our existing commercial law.  
C Summary 
 
According to its detractors, litigation has truly become an option of last resort. 55 
Commercial parties’ and their lawyers’ lack of confidence in the ability of generalist 
judges to grasp the factual and/or legal nuances of many commercial disputes has led 
to a significant loss of commercial litigation in New Zealand. Where parties have the 
choice, disputes are primarily resolved through ADR or in offshore courts, threatening 
the development of New Zealand’s commercial law, and undermining our economic 
growth. The only solution, for many senior practitioners, is an increase in High Court 
specialisation.56 
 
III Does perception match reality? 
 
However, whilst criticisms of the current system abound, an almost universal feature 
of these articles and comments is a lack of empirical data to support their claims. 
Forceful statements are often justified on the basis of personal experience, or 
discussions with other lawyers or judges.57 Numerous unnamed “clients” are referred 
                                               
53 Notwithstanding Tony Molloy QC’s obvious bias, this editorial was vigorously defended by Anthony 
Grant who argued that “… I [do not] think that those who read this article should say that criticism 
from Trusts and Trustees is merely a criticism from Tony Molloy. It is not. The Editorial comments are 
jointly authored and are from a legal journal of international repute with an Editorial Board of 
impeccable quality. That is how readers will interpret them.” See Anthony Grant “How Others See Us: 
A Need for Judicial Specialisation” (14 May 2010) <www.anthonygrant.com>. 
54 For example, Grant, above n 53. See also Galbraith, above n 1, at 421 who argues that “[it] is 
important that the New Zealand court system maintains the integrity and confidence of the commercial 
community in its processes and outcomes, so that New Zealand businesses can argue with confidence 
that New Zealand is an appropriate legal forum for determining disputes arising out of the international 
commerce they engage in.” 
55 For example, Katz, above n 1, at 38.  
56 See, for example, Anthony Grant “Is the High Court’s Civil Jurisdiction in a Death Spiral (part 3)” 
(2010) 153 NZ Lawyer Magazine 9; Galbraith, above n 1; and Molloy and Graham, above n 2, at 120. 
57 See, for instance Galbraith, above n 1, at 422 who justified his comments on the basis of “thirty plus 
years in litigation, and innumerable conversations with other litigators and with commercial clients.” 
JUDICIAL SPECIALISATION IN A GENERALIST JURISDICTION 
 15 
to as supporting a move to specialisation.58 Yet none of this information is made 
public, or available to scrutiny. This is not satisfactory. As the Law Commission 
recently observed, “[i]t would not be sensible for any jurisdiction to introduce change 
into a quality generalist jurisdiction unless the need to do so can be properly 
demonstrated.”59 
 
The purpose of this section is to examine the available evidence to assess whether the 
above concerns represent reality, or mere perception. In this regard, there are two 
main issues. First, what is meant by “commercial cases”? Secondly, has there been a 
drop-off in commercial litigation, or a substantial increase in the use of ADR? 
A What is a “commercial case”? 
 
As a matter of principle, one cannot propose a solution (in this case, increased judicial 
specialisation) without first identifying a problem. Unfortunately, a distinctive feature 
of the judicial specialisation debate has been the failure of practitioners and others to 
define what is, and is not, a “commercial case”.60 Clearly, this is a problem. 
 
Although a murder case undoubtedly involves criminal law and a contract 
performance dispute involves commercial law, the distinction is not always clear-cut. 
Can tax, competition, and now breach of directors’ duties cases, which will often 
involve some form of criminal element, be considered commercial if all of the 
evidence before the court concerns the nature of the market or the reasons for entering 
into a particular transaction? Moreover, how does one classify cases such as Prest v 
Petrodel Resources Ltd,61  which, while nominally a family law dispute, involved 
complex issues about piercing the corporate veil?  
 
New Zealand’s case and statute law provides only limited guidance. In 1986, the 
government attempted to define the scope of “commercial proceedings” eligible for 
entry onto the newly established commercial list. The result was a detailed list of 
proceedings, as set out in s 24B of the Judicature Act 1908. 62  Unfortunately, 
                                               
58 For example, Anthony Grant “Is the High Court’s Civil Jurisdiction in ‘a Death Spiral?’ (Part 1)” (17 
September 2010) <www.anthonygrant.com> stated “I am aware of at least one enterprise that is so 
mistrustful of our senior courts it will not do business in New Zealand unless the parties it contracts 
with agree that all disputes will be litigated off-shore. I am also aware of other enterprises that are not 
willing to do any business in New Zealand because of their lack of confidence in our senior courts.” 
59 Law Commission 2012 Review of the Judicature Act 1908, above n 34, at [10.41]. 
60 See also Frankel, above n 32, at 816. 
61 Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd and others [2013] UKSC 34, [2013] 2 AC 415. 
62 Section 24B of the Judicature Act 1908 defines the commercial list’s jurisdiction as follows: 
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subsequent judicial interpretation has substantially limited the list’s effectiveness as 
an all-purpose definition, with the High Court holding that s 24B simply refers to 
disputes of a sufficiently “commercial flavour”.63 The problem with this interpretation 
is that it immediately becomes a subjective exercise, providing little guidance on what 
is, and is not, considered commercial.64 
 
Nor is there an internationally accepted definition.65 Nevertheless, following the Law 
Commission’s recent approach,66 it is sufficient, at this stage, to adopt the English 
Commercial Court’s approach, which defines a commercial case as any claim relating 
to:67  
 
                                                                                                                                      
(1) The classes of proceedings eligible for entry on a commercial list are as follows: 
(a) any proceedings arising out of or otherwise relating to: 
(i) the ordinary transactions of persons engaged in commerce or trade or of shippers: 
(ii) the carriage of goods for the purpose of trade or commerce: 
(iii) the construction of commercial, shipping, or transport documents: 
(iv) the export or import of merchandise: 
(v) insurance, banking, finance, guarantee, commercial agency, or commercial usages: 
(vi) disputes arising out of intellectual property rights between parties engaged in commerce: 
(b) applications to the court under the Arbitration Act 1996: 
(c) appeals against determinations of the Commerce Commission: 
(d) proceedings under any of the provisions of sections 80, 81, 82, and 89 of the Commerce Act 
1986: 
(e) cases stated by the Financial Markets Authority, and civil proceedings under the Securities 
Act 1978 or the Securities Markets Act 1988: 
(f) the following proceedings in relation to companies registered under the Companies Act 1993: 
(i) applications for directions by liquidators and receivers: 
(ii) defended applications under section 174 of the Companies Act 1993: 
(iii) disputes relating to takeovers: 
(iv) disputes between shareholders or classes of shareholders of companies (other than 
companies having not more than 25 shareholders): 
(g) proceedings of a commercial nature required or permitted to be entered on a commercial list 
by or under any Act or by or under the High Court Rules or any rules made under section 51C 
of this Act. 
63 Cromwell Corp Ltd v Sofrana Immobilier (NZ) Ltd (1988) 1 PRNZ 352 (HC). 
64 One needs to look no further than Wylie J’s statement in Sullivan v Villages of NZ (Pakuranga) Ltd 
(1990) 3 PRNZ 718 (HC) at 721: “It may be difficult to define the line [between commercial and non-
commercial cases] but it should not be difficult to recognise on which side of the line a particular case 
should fall.” 
65 Compare, for example, the definition of commercial proceedings under r 45.1 of the Uniform Civil 
Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) and the definition of commercial under art 1(1) of the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration GA Res 
61/33, A/61/17 (1985). 
66 Law Commission 2012 Review of the Judicature Act 1908, above n 34, at [10.12]. 
67 Civil Procedure Rules (UK), r 58.1(2). 
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(a) a business document or contract; 
(b) the export or import of goods; 
(c) the carriage of goods by land, sea, air or pipeline; 
(d) the exploitation of oil and gas reserves or other natural resources; 
(e) insurance and re-insurance; 
(f) banking and financial services; 
(g) the operation of markets and exchanges; 
(h) the purchase and sale of commodities; 
(i) the construction of ships; 
(j) business agency; and 
(k) arbitration. 
B Has there been a decline in commercial litigation? 
 
Having roughly defined what is, and is not, “commercial”, it becomes possible to 
assess whether there has been a substantial drop-off in the level of commercial 
litigation, or a large increase in the use of ADR, as one would expect if concerns 
about judicial specialisation are valid. 
1 High Court proceedings 
 
Unfortunately, as the Law Commission recently discovered, it is almost impossible to 
determine whether the High Court has experienced a decline in the number of 
commercial proceedings.68 
 
One reason for this is that neither the High Court,69 nor the Ministry of Justice,70 
provides detailed breakdowns of the types of claims filed, or the numbers that are 
disposed of through trial. In general, reports distinguish between criminal trials, 
criminal appeals, civil proceedings,71 and civil appeals.72 Furthermore, even though 
                                               
68 Law Commission 2012 Review of the Judicature Act 1908, above n 34, at [10.42]. 
69 See generally Courts of New Zealand “Annual Statistics” <www.courtsofnz.govt.nz>. 
70 See generally the Ministry of Justice Annual Report 1 July 2011 – 30 June 2012 (Wellington, 2012); 
and Ministry of Justice Annual Report 1 July 2010 – 30 June 2011 (Wellington, 2011). 
71 Defined by s 2 of the Judicature Act 1908 as “any proceedings in the court, other than criminal 
proceedings”. 
72 See, for example, Helen Winkelmann “Report from the High Court 2011 – The Year in Review” (23 
February 2012) Courts of New Zealand <www.courtsofnz.govt.nz>; Helen Winkelmann “Report from 
the High Court 2012 – The Year in Review” Courts of New Zealand <www.courtsofnz.govt.nz>; and 
Helen Winkelmann “Report from the High Court 2013 – The Year in Review” (9 April 2014) Courts of 
New Zealand <www.courtsofnz.govt.nz>. 
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reports occasionally provide additional breakdowns, distinguishing insolvency claims 
and judicial review applications from other cases, this provides little to no information 
as to the underlying nature of the remaining “general proceedings”.73 As a result, it is 
almost impossible to identify the number of commercial (rather than civil) claims 
going before the court, let alone identify the nature of these claims. 
 
This is not the only problem one faces when attempting to assess the High Court’s 
commercial workload. Reports often use different time periods, and have conflicting 
figures. Take, for example, the data presented in the 2012 and 2013 High Court 
Annual Reports.  
2012 High Court Annual Report74 
Summary of new business and disposals for the year ended 30 November 2012 
 Jury Trials Civil Proceedings Criminal appeals Civil Appeals 
New Business     
2012 212 2889 1158 341 
2011 162 3005 1194 353 
Disposals     
2012 206 3072 1206 328 
2011 184 3164 1213 314 
Disposals by trial adjudication     
2012 113 158   
2011 123 136   
Disposals by non-trial adjudication     
2012  494   
2011  587   
 
2013 High Court Annual Report75 
Summary of new business and disposals for the year ended 31 December 2013 
 Criminal 
Trials 
Civil Proceedings Criminal appeals Civil Appeals 
New Business     
2013 215 2669 1043 317 
2012 232 2827 1179 338 
Disposals     
2013 222 2598 1048 317 
2012 212 3047 1213 320 
Disposals by trial adjudication     
2013  365   
2012  386   
Disposals by non-trial adjudication     
2013  789   
2012  1020   
                                               
73  For instance, Courts of New Zealand “Annual Statistics for the High Court December 2012” 
<www.courtsofnz.govt.nz>. 
74 Table sourced from Winkelmann “2012 High Court Annual Report”, above n 72, at 4. 
75 Table sourced from Winkelmann “2013 High Court Annual Report”, above n 72, at 9. 
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As will be immediately apparent, the reports are conflicting and impossible to 
reconcile. Whereas the 2013 report clearly covers the 12 months from 1 January 2013 
to 31 December 2013, the 2012 report fails to clarify whether the period covered is 
the 11 months from January 2012 to November 2012, or the full 12 months from 
December 2011 to November 2012. Already, therefore, one faces significant 
difficulties when trying to compare the two reports.  
 
However, of greater concern are the reports’ conflicting statistics. According to the 
2013 report, the High Court resolved 386 civil proceedings by trial in 2012, 
dramatically overstating the 2012 report’s version of events, which recorded only 158 
civil cases as being determined by trial to the year ended 30 November. Thus, unless 
the High Court released 228 judgments in December 2012 (the one month for which 
there is no data), the two reports are irreconcilable, preventing any meaningful 
comparison.  
 
Faced with contradictory official reports, the Law Commission examined a small 
sample of the civil cases that were “disposed of” in the Auckland and Wellington 
High Court registries between 2008 and 2010.76 Whilst they successfully broke the 
claims down into 41 categories, such as negligence, contract, and insurance cases, 
their work provided little insight for three reasons. First, because the categorisation 
was done by court staff, it “is not necessarily as accurate as if it had been done by 
legally trained people.”77 Secondly, because the claims were broken down into so 
many categories, “it is difficult to get a broad sense of the overall classes of case[s]” 
determined by the High Court.78  Finally, because the sample only considered claims 
that progressed to trial, it failed to provide any information on the roughly 91–93% of 
proceedings that settle pre-trial.79  
 
There is, therefore, no publically available information to support or refute 
practitioners’ claims that a significant amount of commercial litigation is being 
diverted from the High Court to alternative dispute fora.  
2 District Court proceedings 
 
Nor is there any conclusive evidence to suggest that the District Court has lost its 
commercial jurisdiction. Although this paper focuses on the High Court, the vast 
                                               
76 Law Commission 2012 Review of the Judicature Act 1908, above n 34, at [10.48] (emphasis added). 
77 Law Commission 2012 Review of the Judicature Act 1908, above n 34, at [10.50]. 
78 Law Commission 2012 Review of the Judicature Act 1908, above n 34, at [10.50]. 
79 Winkelmann “2012 High Court Annual Report”, above n 72 at 6; and Winkelmann “2013 High 
Court Annual Report”, above n 72, at 11. 
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majority of New Zealand’s civil disputes, up to a value of $200,000,80 are resolved by 
generalist judges in the District Court.  Accordingly, if, as practitioners claim, 
commercial parties have lost confidence in generalist judges’ abilities to grasp the 
factual and/or legal nuances of their disputes, one would expect to see a decline in the 
level of District Court commercial litigation.  
 
Prima facie, this is exactly what has happened.81 As the following graph reveals, the 
number of defended cases filed, and disposed of at trial by the District Court fell by 
almost two-thirds between June 2009 and June 2013, suggesting strong litigant 
dissatisfaction with the generalist court system.  
 
 
However, this decline in litigation provides little support for practitioners’ claims for 
two reasons. 
 
First, the District Court has always used generalist judges to resolve civil disputes. 
Accordingly, it would be unlikely that litigants suddenly lost confidence in the 
Court’s judges between 2009 and 2010. Instead, as the Court’s annual reports reveal, 
                                               
80 District Courts Act 1947, s 29. This jurisdiction is set to increase to $350,000 under cl 256 of the 
Judicature Modernisation Bill 2013 (178 – 2). 
81  Graph sourced from District Courts of New Zealand Annual Report 2013 (Wellington) at 39. 
Importantly, the graph and accompanying figures only relate to those cases which proceeded to trial. 
There are no publically available statistics on the number of civil claims filed. 
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a more likely explanation for the rapid decline was the introduction of new District 
Court Rules in November 2009,82 which strongly encouraged pre-trial settlement.83  
 
Unfortunately, there is no publically available data on the number of civil claims filed, 
however, the increased focus on pre-trial settlements from November 2009 explains 
the rapid decline in the number of “defended civil cases”, as plotted on the graph 
above. Indeed, this explanation is further supported by the stabilisation in civil 
litigation numbers between 2012 and 2013, after all of the changes ‘washed through’.  
 
Secondly, even if it were possible to ‘strip-out’ the new court rules’ impact, the 
District Court’s statistics only refer to “civil litigation”, providing no information as to 
the underlying state of “commercial litigation”.  
 
Consequently, as with the High Court, there is no publically available information to 
support practitioners’ claims that commercial parties have lost confidence in 
generalist judges’ ability to resolve their disputes.  
C Has there been an upsurge in ADR’s popularity? 
 
Nevertheless, if, as many practitioners claim, the High Court is in danger of losing its 
commercial litigation practice, 84  then one would expect to see, first, a significant 
increase in the use of ADR and, secondly, evidence linking this rise in ADR to the 
High Court’s generalist structure, rather than factors such as time, cost and flexibility. 
Once again, however, there is a distinct lack of empirical evidence.  
 
Whereas the Ministry of Justice compiles data on the number of claims filed and 
resolved in New Zealand’s courts, there is no central dispute resolution body to 
collate or produce any meaningful ADR statistics.85 Moreover, because disputes are 
resolved confidentially, and in many different fora, it becomes almost impossible for 
researchers even to begin to estimate the numbers of disputes resolved outside the 
court system. 
 
                                               
82 District Court Rules 2009, r 1.2.  
83  Courts of New Zealand “Annual Statistics for the District Courts – December 2011” 
<www.courtsofnz.govt.nz> 
84 For example Galbraith, above n 1, at 421 who stated that “in Auckland, the majority of substantial 
commercial disputes, other than debt collecting, are now determined by alternative dispute fora – 
arbitrators and mediators”. 
85 Whilst there are two ADR professional organisations in New Zealand – LEADR (Lawyers Engaged 
in Alternative Dispute Resolution) and AMINZ (Arbitrators’ and Mediators’ Institute of New Zealand), 
neither compile statistics on the use of ADR in New Zealand. 
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Fortunately, there is one very limited exception. In 2004, the Ministry of Justice 
released a report on the use of ADR in “general civil cases.”86 Based upon surveys 
with lawyers, ADR professionals, litigants and judges, the research attempted to 
answer many of the “unanswered questions”, such as whether ADR’s use was 
growing, and the reasons for that growth, if any.87  
 
In terms of ADR’s overall use, the report’s findings were underwhelming. Perhaps 
reflecting the nature of a survey, the report simply found that:88 
 
With the exception of [litigants], all the stakeholder groups expressed a view that 
the use of ADR is increasing. Among ADR practitioners, however … there is a 
view that the increase in ADR take-up, especially mediation, has not been as 
pronounced or as extensive as predicted in the 1980s and 1990s. 
 
Nevertheless, other aspects of the report are illuminating. Lawyers who primarily 
worked in the High Court reported that of the 1,923 general civil cases they handled 
in 2002,89 1,193 were filed in the High Court, and 730 were not.90 In other words, 
only 61% of claims, eligible to be heard in the High Court, were actually filed.91 
Furthermore, of the 730 unfiled claims, lawyers reported that 494 were settled through 
ADR during the survey’s time period.92  
 
In many respects, this lends significant weight to practitioners’ claims that the High 
Court is at risk of losing its civil jurisdiction. If the above figures are correct, then the 
High Court may hear less than 5.5% of all civil claims in New Zealand. 93 
Furthermore, with 88.5% of lawyers surveyed reporting that commercial contract 
disputes were suitable for ADR,94 the risk is that the proportion of commercial (rather 
than civil) cases being diverted from courts to ADR is considerably higher. 
 
                                               
86  K Saville-Smith and R Fraser Alternative Dispute Resolution: General Civil Cases (Ministry of 
Justice, Wellington, 2004). 
87 Saville-Smith and Fraser, above n 86, at 2. 
88 Saville-Smith and Fraser, above n 86, at 16. 
89 The survey covered the period 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2002. 
90 Saville-Smith and Fraser, above n 86, at 40. 
91 Saville-Smith and Fraser, above n 86, at 40. 
92 This was done primarily through lawyer-lawyer negotiation and mediation. See Saville-Smith and 
Fraser, above n 86, at 40. 
93 If one accepts that the High Court resolves between 7 – 9% of all civil claims filed, as suggested by 
the High Court annual reports, and only 61% of civil claims are filed in the High Court, then on the 
basis of these figures, the High Court would determine only 5.49% of all reported civil disputes. 
94 Saville-Smith and Fraser, above n 86, at 14. 
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However, this does not provide sufficient evidence to support practitioners’ claims 
that litigants are being driven into ADR due to a lack of High Court specialisation for 
two reasons. First, the survey was conducted in 2003, with the questions relating to 
2002. In the intervening decade, lawyer and client perceptions of ADR and the High 
Court may have changed significantly, leading to the survey’s results becoming 
outdated by 2014.  
 
Secondly, and more importantly, the survey fails to identify the extent to which the 
High Court’s generalist structure is fuelling ADR’s use. 95  ADR offers many 
advantages over litigation independent of the level of judicial specialisation, such as 
reduced cost and time relative to court proceedings,96 and increased confidentiality97 
and flexibility.98 Thus, while the survey may be useful as a historical benchmark for 
any future research, it fails to shed much light on the link between a lack of judicial 
specialisation and ADR’s use.  
                                               
95 The report provided the following table. Saville-Smith and Fraser, above n 86, at 27. 
Lawyers’ Perceptions of Disputants’ Reasons for ADR Take-Up (multiple responses allowed) 
Perceived Disputant Reason Responses % of Lawyers (n = 196) 
Want to reduce costs 
Want speedy resolution 
Uncertainty of court outcome 
Preservation of ongoing relationship 
Desire for compromise solution 
Desire for more control over process and outcome 
Privacy and confidentiality 
Directed by contract, statute or existing agreement 
Desire for creative solution 
Concerns about court procedures 
183 
159 
142 
86 
82 
80 
74 
61 
48 
39 
93.4 
81.1 
72.4 
43.9 
41.8 
40.8 
37.8 
31.1 
24.5 
19.9 
Importantly, one cannot use the uncertainty of court outcome as a proxy for judicial specialisation 
given the number of other explanations for such a response. 
96 See, for example, Saville-Smith and Fraser, above n 86, at 26 – 29; Susan Blake, Julie Browne and 
Stuart Sime A Practical Approach to Alternative Dispute Resolution (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2012) at [14.14]; and Roger Pitchforth “Arbitration” in Peter Spiller (ed) Dispute Resolution in 
New Zealand (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, Sydney, 2007) at 130. 
97 For example, David L Kreider, head of Vodafone New Zealand’s legal team who stated that: “Above 
all else, a ‘household name’ business and consumer services company like Vodafone, when faced with 
a dispute, will wish to protect its brand and reputation. In any dispute situation, this is my overarching 
objective” (emphasis added). He continued, “[f]or this reason, the privacy, and where available, the 
confidentiality, offered by arbitration is a very attractive feature to in-house counsels.” David L Kreider 
“A Corporate General Counsel’s Perspective on Arbitration” (speech to the Arbitrators’ and Mediators’ 
Institute of New Zealand Conference, Auckland, 4 – 6 August 2011). See also Virginia Goldblatt 
“Confidentiality in Mediation” [2000] NZ L Rev 392 at 392. 
98 Whereas litigation is governed by strict rules of procedure set out in the District Court Rules 2009 
and the High Court Rules, ADR is far more flexible. For example, in both arbitration and mediation, 
parties have free reign over the location, dates, timetabling and choice of New Zealand or foreign law. 
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IV Where to from here? 
 
How, then, can one assess whether specialist High Court commercial panels are 
required or desirable? 
A Seek and they shall come 
 
One suggestion, recently adopted by both the Law Commission and the government, 
has been to take a ‘seek and they shall come’ approach.99 The idea “is that expertise is 
like a magnet. The more there is of it, the more people will be drawn to it.”100 By 
introducing judicial specialisation, commercial parties who were previously unwilling 
to use the court system will come out of the woodwork, leading to increased use of the 
High Court, and an increased ability to shape New Zealand’s commercial law.101 
 
The problem is that reform commenced on this basis threatens to affect the provision 
of justice in New Zealand profoundly, with little to no guarantee of success. Even if 
this approach could be justified in other areas, changes that fundamentally affect the 
nature of the judiciary should not be introduced based solely on a perception voiced 
by senior members of the legal profession. 
B A more principled approach 
 
Instead, fundamental reform of the judiciary should only occur if empirical evidence 
or comprehensive survey results clearly demonstrate a link between commercial 
disputes, ADR, and a lack of High Court specialisation.102 In particular, it is suggested 
that judicial specialisation will only be justified if it can be shown that: 
 
1. relative to historical trends and comparable jurisdictions, the High Court has 
‘lost’ a significant proportion of its commercial jurisdiction (both in terms of 
numbers of cases filed, and types of cases heard and decided); 
2. the ‘lost’ commercial cases are being resolved through ADR or in offshore 
fora; and 
3. the primary reason for litigants’ movement away from the formal civil justice 
system is a lack of judicial specialisation. 
                                               
99 Law Commission 2012 Review of the Judicature Act 1908, above n 34, at [10.60]; and (5 December 
2013) 695 NZPD 15305 per Raymond Huo MP. See also Allsop, above n 47, at 15. 
100 Grant, above n 53. 
101 See, for instance, Law Commission 2012 Review of the Judicature Act 1908, above n 34, at [10.60] 
(emphasis added). 
102 Law Commission 2012 Review of the Judicature Act 1908, above n 34, at [10.41]. 
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The reasons for adopting these criteria, and the means by which research into these 
may be carried out, are summarised below. 
1 Loss of the High Court’s commercial jurisdiction 
 
Notwithstanding practitioners’ claims that specialist judges deliver higher quality 
judgments in a shorter time and at a lower cost than generalist judges,103 there can be 
no mandate to introduce judicial specialisation until research reveals that the High 
Court has lost a significant portion of its commercial jurisdiction. 
 
The core difference between a loss of litigation due to a lack of specialisation, and the 
speed, quality and cost of judgments in a generalist system, is that the latter can be 
fixed through moderate changes within the current system, whereas the former cannot. 
Issues of speed and cost can be reduced through more intensive case management 
procedures,104 whilst inadequate judicial reasoning is remedied through the exercise of 
parties’ rights of appeal. In contrast, a loss of litigation due to a lack of judicial 
specialisation cannot be remedied by tinkering with the current system. Proceedings 
are either filed in the High Court, or not.  
 
Accordingly, any introduction of judicial specialisation must be predicated on a 
finding that the High Court lacks exposure to a significant portion of New Zealand’s 
commercial jurisdiction. This may be established through, inter alia, a combination of 
historical research and comparisons with similar common law jurisdictions.  
 
Specifically, the Law Commission (or other research agency) should attempt to map 
out (a) the number of civil cases filed; (b) the number of defended trials; and (c) the 
percentage of defended trials per filing across the High Court and other specialist New 
Zealand courts105 over the last 30 – 40 years.106 This data can then be used in several 
ways.  
                                               
103 For example, Molloy, above n 17, at 20; Katz, above n 1, at 39. See also Glazebrook, above n 7, at 
537; and Letter from Michael Black (Chief Justice of the Federal Court of Australia) to Bruce 
Robertson (President of the Law Commission) regarding judicial specialisation (August 2003), cited in 
Law Commission Delivering Justice for All: A Vision for New Zealand Courts and Tribunals (NZLC 
R85, 2004) [Law Commission Delivering Justice for All] at 266. 
104 See generally, Helen Winkelmann and others The New High Court Case Management Regime (New 
Zealand Law Society, Wellington, 2013). For a contrary view, see Jim Farmer “Civil Litigation in 
Crisis” in New Zealand Bar Association Civil Litigation in Crisis – What Crisis (February 2008). 
105 Such as the Employment, Environment and Family Courts.  
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First, reflecting population growth, one would expect to see a significant increase in 
both the numbers of filings and defended High Court trials over the time period. If 
this is not the case, then this indicates that litigants are increasingly looking towards 
ADR to resolve their disputes, suggesting a loss of High Court litigation. 
 
Secondly, the Law Commission should compare the percentage of defended hearings 
per filings across the High Court and specialist New Zealand courts to determine 
whether a disproportionate proportion of High Court cases are settled pre-trial relative 
to other courts. Although far from conclusive, data showing higher settlement rates in 
the High Court, relative to specialist courts, indicates that litigants are reluctant to 
allow their disputes to be resolved by generalist judges.107 Where data is available, 
these settlement rates could be compared to the settlement rates in other common law 
jurisdictions. 
 
Thirdly, by taking a geographically representative sample of cases filed in the High 
Court registries108 over the past 40 years,109 historical data trend analysis can reveal 
changes in the nature of the High Court’s work over time. This is particularly useful 
in determining whether the Court is ‘losing’ some of its commercial jurisdiction. For 
example, if contract disputes formed 25% of all civil filings in 1970, but only 5% in 
2014, then this would strongly suggest that parties engaged in contract disputes are 
bypassing the High Court in favour of other dispute resolution fora. If possible, this 
data should then be compared to data in other common law jurisdictions to determine 
whether these trends are specific to New Zealand, or have been experienced 
throughout the rest of the world.  
                                                                                                                                      
106 For an example of historical data trend analysis, see Marc Galanter “The Vanishing Trial: An 
Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts” (2004) 1 Journal of Empirical 
Legal Studies 459. 
107  When comparing the High Court’s settlement rates with other specialist courts, the Law 
Commission (or other research body) will have to be mindful of statutory regimes that require a dispute 
to be litigated. Where this is the case, settlement rates are likely to be artificially low. Accordingly, an 
allowance may need to be made when conducting this exercise.  
108 A geographically representative sample is required because the majority of commercial disputes 
occur in Auckland. For example, in 2013, 74% of all civil proceedings were filed in the area covered 
by the Auckland circuit; 81% in 2012; and 67% in 2011. See Winkelmann “2011 High Court Annual 
Report”, above n 72; Winkelmann “2012 High Court Annual Report”, above n 72; and Winkelmann 
“2013 High Court Annual Report”, above n 72. 
109 Specialisation has been an issue since at least 1978 (see the Report of the Royal Commission on the 
Courts, above n 30, at 93 – 96). Accordingly, research should attempt to cover this period so that the 
effects of specialisation on the High Court’s workload can be isolated and examined.   
JUDICIAL SPECIALISATION IN A GENERALIST JURISDICTION 
 27 
2 The ‘lost’ cases are being resolved offshore or in ADR 
 
Even if historical or comparative research reveals that the number of commercial 
cases filed and determined in the High Court has declined, or failed to rise in line with 
population growth, this is only part of the picture. The next step is to show that the 
“missing” cases are being resolved either offshore, or through ADR. 
 
Unfortunately, because there is no historical data on ADR’s use in commercial 
disputes this will have to be estimated through surveys designed to reveal the current 
position. The Law Commission should survey a geographically representative sample 
of lawyers, accredited ADR professionals110 and, if possible, commercial parties to 
determine (a) the number of disputes they are involved in; (b) the legal issues 
involved in the dispute; (c) whether those disputes were filed in the High Court; and 
(d) how those disputes were resolved.111  
 
The purpose of this research is to determine both the size of the ADR market, and the 
nature of cases resolved through ADR. This information can then be compared to the 
High Court data in a further attempt to determine whether the cases resolved in the 
High Court are representative of New Zealand’s commercial disputes. 
3 Link between ADR and judicial specialisation 
 
Finally, the Law Commission (or other research body) must determine the extent of 
the connection between the generalist High Court and litigants’ choice to pursue 
ADR. This is the most important piece of the puzzle. Without a direct link, no amount 
of evidence showing a loss of High Court commercial litigation can provide any 
justification for introducing judicial specialisation.112 
 
This could be done by surveying a representative sample of lawyers113 and clients, 
and asking them to rate the importance of factors such as time, cost, flexibility, 
                                               
110 The two bodies who provide some form of accreditation in New Zealand are LEADR (Lawyers 
Engaged in Alternative Dispute Resolution) and AMINZ (Arbitrators’ and Mediators’ Institute of New 
Zealand). 
111 It will also be necessary to determine the size of the dispute to ensure that it is within the High 
Court’s jurisdiction rather than the District Courts.  
112 This statement assumes that a failure to identify any link between the lack of judicial specialisation 
and the parties’ decision to use ADR implies that parties chose to pursue ADR for reasons such as cost, 
time, confidentiality and flexibility.  
113 Lawyers’ responses will be of particular importance following the implementation of r 14.4 of the 
Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008 which obliges lawyers 
to “… keep the client advised of alternatives to litigation that are reasonably available (unless the 
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confidentiality and the lack of judicial specialisation, on their decision to pursue ADR 
rather than litigation.  
 
Whilst this survey questionnaire may take many forms, it should contain several 
questions addressing the High Court’s lack of specialisation for two reasons. First, 
asking a question such as “to what extent did the High Court’s lack of specialist 
judges influence your decision to use ADR?” has the potential to bias the results 
significantly. In particular, respondents may have given little thought to the High 
Court’s generalist structure at the time they chose to use ADR, but when presented 
with such a question may falsely attribute part of their decision to this factor.114 
 
Secondly, splitting the question into multiple parts will offer greater insight than 
simply asking one question.115 Thus, questions may, inter alia, try work out whether 
the allocation of a particular judge influenced the parties’ decision to avoid litigation, 
or whether the parties believed that a generalist judge would struggle to understand 
the relevant facts. By asking multiple questions, it becomes possible to pinpoint 
litigants’ fears or concerns, enabling researchers to determine the extent of the link 
between the generalist bench and ‘ADR’s rise’.116 
4 Summary 
 
Unless solid evidence conclusively links the High Court’s lack of specialisation to a 
loss of commercial litigation, fundamental reform of the judiciary cannot be justified. 
By following the steps outlined above, it is suggested that the Law Commission 
would be capable of determining this issue, providing a sound foundation for the 
introduction of High Court specialisation if such a need is identified.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                      
lawyer believes on reasonable grounds that the client already has an understanding of those 
alternatives) to enable the client to make informed decisions regarding the resolution of the dispute.”  
114  See generally Floyd J and Fowler Jr Survey Research Methods (4th ed, SAGE Publications, 
Thousand Oaks (CA), 2009) at 14 – 16. 
115 Floyd and Fowler, above n 114, at 111 argue that for surveys seeking to determine a respondent’s 
views on issues, it is best to “[a]sk multiple questions, with different question forms [because] … the 
answers are potentially influenced both by the subjective state to be measured and by specific features 
of the respondent or of the questions. Some respondents avoid extreme categories; some tend to agree 
more than disagree. Multiple questions help even out response idiosyncrasies and improve the validity 
of the measurement process”. 
116 Obviously these are just suggestions. If the Law Commission was to carry out further research, 
specialist market advice on framing the relevant questions will be needed. 
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V Specialisation Overseas 
 
Calls for increased judicial specialisation are not limited to New Zealand, with 
countries around the world facing demands from practitioners and others to provide 
specialist commercial courts or judges.117 By analysing the court systems in England, 
Australia, Singapore and the Cayman Islands, conclusions can be drawn, and lessons 
learnt, if New Zealand chooses to go down the judicial specialisation path.  
A England118 
 
Established in 1895 as part of a judicial initiative to halt the increasing use of 
arbitration by London’s merchants,119 the English Commercial Court is perhaps the 
most well-known, and successful, specialist court in the common law world. 120  
Located in a purpose-built building with its own support staff, the Court operates 
under the auspices of the Queen’s Bench Division of the England and Wales High 
Court,121 where it has jurisdiction over “any claim arising out of the transactions of 
trade and commerce”.122  
 
Parties from around the world, who often have no connection to the United Kingdom, 
are increasingly entering into contracts to resolve their disputes in the Commercial 
Court,123 providing a significant boost to England’s jurisprudence, economy and legal 
                                               
117 For examples of other jurisdictions that have faced pressure to increase judicial specialisation, see 
the Chief Justice’s Working Party on Civil Justice Reform Civil Justice Reform (2004) Hong Kong 
Judiciary <http://www.judiciary.gov.hk>; and the Scottish Civil Courts Review Report of the Scottish 
Civil Courts Review (September 2009). 
118 The author acknowledges that England and Wales share the same legal system. Thus, all references 
to England should be read as meaning England and Wales. 
119 See, for example, the comments of one anonymous High Court judge who stated “The bulk of the 
disputes of the commercial world seldom, in these modern days, finds its way into the Courts. 
Merchants are shy of litigation. … They prefer even the hazardous and mysterious chances of 
arbitration …” Published in The Times on 10 August 1892. Quoted from Anthony Colman, Victor 
Lyon and Philippa Hopkins The Practice and Procedure of the Commercial Court (6th ed, Informa 
Law, London, 2008) at 4. It was not until the passage of the Administration of Justice Act 1970 (UK) 
that the Court achieved statutory recognition. 
120  See, for example, Richardson, above n 1, at 132. See also Galbraith, above n 1, at 421; and 
Southwell, above n 11, at 275.  
121 Senior Courts Act 1981 (UK), s 6. 
122 Civil Procedure Rules (UK), r 58.2(2). 
123 Richard Aikens “With a View to Despatch” in Mads Andenas and Duncan Fairgrieve (ed) Tom 
Bingham and the Transformation of the Law; A Liber Amicorum (Oxford University Press, London, 
2009) at 587 noted in 2009: “The Commercial Court statistics have consistently shown for about ten 
years that in 80% of its cases, at least one of the parties is a non-UK entity. In 50% of its cases all the 
parties are non-UK entities”. This appears to have grown over time, with a 2013 study showing that 
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sector. Legal services now account for 1.8% of the United Kingdom’s gross domestic 
product, with exports from the provision of legal services to foreigners tripling over a 
ten year period to £3.2 billion in 2009. 124  Building directly off the Commercial 
Court’s reputation, London has also become the world’s most popular seat of 
arbitration, providing significant income to the English legal profession.125  
 
A large part of this success has been attributed to the Court’s judges.126 Appointed on 
the basis of their pre-bench commercial experience by the Lord Chief Justice, after 
consulting with the Lord Chancellor,127 all commercial court judges are judges of the 
High Court. This is important, because, as puisne judges, they are still required to 
preside over criminal cases. Thus, in 2004, of the 14 judges appointed to sit in the 
Court, only 8 to 9 sat in the Commercial Court full-time due to other commitments.128 
If England, a country with almost 15 times the population of New Zealand cannot 
sustain a fully specialist commercial court, then this strongly suggests that High Court 
specialisation in New Zealand would only require judges in a part-time capacity.129  
 
However, as the Commercial Court’s history reveals, specialist judges only form part 
of the picture. In 1960, the Court risked oblivion.130 Filings had plummeted to just 27 
in 1958,131 and judges such as Devlin J openly questioned whether “the time may 
come when it will have to be considered whether there is any longer any value in the 
Commercial Court”.132 Since then, the Court has embarked on a series of reforms to 
ensure its continued viability, providing several lessons for New Zealand if it chooses 
to pursue judicial specialisation. 
                                                                                                                                      
“over 75% of litigants using the Commercial Court are foreign, with the highest regional representation 
from Europe and Eurasia” Portland Communications “The World’s Legal Capital? Who Uses the 
Commercial Court” <www.portland-communications.com>.  
124 Ministry of Justice and UK Trade & Investment “Plan for Growth: Promoting the UK’s Legal 
Services Sector” (30 March 2012) <www.justice.gov.uk> at 1. 
125 See generally Aikens, above n 123, at 576 – 577. 
126  See, for example, the Report of the Singapore International Commercial Court Committee 
(November 2013) <www.mlaw.gov.sg> at 11 which states “… The success of the UK legal sector is 
founded on the global dominance of English law for contracts, the prestige and standing of its judicial 
system, in particular the Commercial Court, and the acknowledged quality of its commercial judges 
and barristers” (emphasis added). 
127 Senior Courts Act 1981, s 6(2). 
128 See generally Report and Recommendations of the Commercial Court Long Trials Working Party 
(December 2007) <www.judiciary.gov.uk> at [163] – [176] which strongly defended the use of 
Commercial Court judges in criminal trials.  
129 Indeed, the Law Commission appears to have accepted this. See Law Commission 2012 Review of 
the Judicature Act 1908, above n 34, at [10.69]. 
130 Aikens, above n 123, at 571; and Colman, Lyon and Hopkins, above n 119, at 8. 
131 Colman, Lyon and Hopkins, above n 119, at 8. 
132 Peter Cassidy Seed Co Ltd v Osuutukkukauppa IL [1957] 1 WLR 273 at 280. 
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At the heart of this reform has been a high level of practitioner and client involvement 
in the Court’s development and administration through the Commercial Court Users 
Committee. Established in 1960, and formalised in 1977, the Committee is chaired by 
the judge in charge of the Commercial Court, and contains representatives from the 
bar, solicitors, arbitrators, banks, government agencies, and a variety of domestic and 
foreign commercial litigants.133 It meets at least four times a year, and is heavily 
involved in the Court’s administration and procedure, helping to ensure that the Court 
remains competitive, and retains a steady stream of litigation.134 
 
For example, a direct product of the Committee’s reports has been the adoption of 
several procedures designed to reduce trial lengths, and encourage efficiency. Thus, 
statements of claim are limited to 25 pages,135 and witnesses are required to provide 
written statements136 to be used in place of an oral examination in chief.137 Pre-trial 
settlement is also encouraged through the parties’ ability to request, subject to the 
judge in charge of the Commercial Court’s approval, “a without-prejudice, non-
binding early neutral evaluation (ENE) of a dispute or of particular issues” by a 
commercial court judge.138  
 
Interestingly, even with the ability to seek an ENE, only 70% of Commercial Court 
cases settle before trial, compared with 91% in New Zealand’s High Court 139  – 
possibly reflecting a higher degree of litigant confidence in the specialist Commercial 
Court judges. 
 
Finally, recent statutory reforms have ensured that the Commercial Court is not faced 
with an impossibly high workload. Since the 1990s, straightforward commercial 
disputes of a lower value140 have been diverted to Mercantile Courts based in London 
                                               
133 Colman, Lyon and Hopkins, above n 119, at 27. 
134 Colman, Lyon and Hopkins, above n 119, at 27 – 32. 
135 Her Majesty’s Courts & Tribunals Service The Admiralty and Commercial Courts Guide (9th ed, 
March 2013) at C1.1. This limit will only be extended in exceptional cases “where a party shows good 
reasons for doing so.” 
136 The Admiralty and Commercial Courts Guide, above n 136, at C1.1. These statements are limited to 
30 pages in length unless the court directs otherwise. 
137 The Admiralty and Commercial Courts Guide, above n 136, at H1.6. 
138 The Admiralty and Commercial Courts Guide, above n 136, at G.2. If the parties choose to continue 
their litigation, the judge who performed the ENE will take no further part in the case, “unless the 
parties agree otherwise” – see The Admiralty and Commercial Courts Guide, above n 136, at G.2.5 
139 Aikens, above n 123, at 578. 
140 There is no upper limit on the Mercantile Court’s jurisdiction, but it is safe to assume that disputes 
of less than US$500,000 will end up in the Mercantile Court. See Colman, Lyon and Hopkins, above n 
119, at 47. 
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and other major cities.141 Like the Commercial Court, these Courts remain part of the 
Queen’s Bench Division of the High Court, and are staffed with specialist commercial 
judges. This has ensured that litigants throughout England and Wales have access to 
specialist judges, whilst allowing the Commercial Court to concentrate on higher 
value and more complicated commercial claims. 
 
In summary, whilst the provision of specialist judges helped to establish the Court in 
the early 20th century, it has achieved its current position as the “curia franca of 
international commerce”142 through its continuous efforts to adapt its structure and 
procedures to meet the business community’s, and its lawyer’s, needs.  
B Australia 
 
As New Zealand’s closest neighbour, our second largest trading partner, and a fellow 
common law jurisdiction, Australia, and its level of specialisation, is of particular 
relevance to New Zealand. Accordingly, this paper briefly considers the specialist 
structures within the Federal Court of Australia (FCA), and the Supreme Court of 
New South Wales. 
1 Federal Court of Australia 
 
Established in 1976,143 the FCA provides an interesting comparison due to its use of 
specialist panels and individual docket system. 
 
Unlike the other courts surveyed, the level of judicial specialisation differs across the 
FCA’s registries. In some parts of Australia, for example, South Australia and the 
Australian Capital Territory, judges are generalists, and there is no specialisation. In 
contrast, the FCA’s larger registries,144 have established specialist panels in areas such 
as intellectual property, tax, competition, corporations, and workplace relations.145 In 
this regard, the FCA can be seen as a quasi-specialist court. Depending upon the 
                                               
141 Mercantile Courts are based in the district registries of the High Court in Birmingham, Bristol, 
Cardiff, Chester, Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester, Mold and Newcastle upon Tyne and London. Civil 
Procedure Rules 1998 (UK) Practice Direction 59 – Mercantile Courts at 1.2. 
142 Amin Rasheed Shipping Company Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co [1983] 1 WLR 228 (CA) at 240 per 
Sir John Donaldson MR. 
143 Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 19. See generally, Bernard Cairns Australian Civil 
Procedure (10th ed, Thomson Reuters, Sydney, 2014) at 7. There are currently more than 150 Acts 
granting the FCA jurisdiction to hear a wide variety of issues. For a full list see Federal Court of 
Australia “Acts which Confer Jurisdiction” (31 January 2014) <www.fedcourt.gov.au>. 
144 Specialist panels exist in the New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland registries. For a full list 
see Federal Court of Australia “Panels for the Docket System” (May 2014) <www.fedcourt.gov.au>. 
145 Federal Court of Australia, above n 144.  
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nature of the dispute and the registry in which it is filed, cases may be allocated to 
either a specialist or generalist judge.  
 
Of greater importance, however, is the means by which panel judges are appointed. 
Whilst the FCA Chief Justice nominally controls the appointments process, by 
convention, judges are assigned to panels for a three-year term, 146  upon their 
request. 147  This is important for two reasons. First, by providing judges with a 
guaranteed three-year tenure, panel judges face less pressure to appease the Chief 
Justice in order to remain on the panel. As will be explained in the context of the New 
Zealand government’s proposed reforms, this helps to safeguard individual judicial 
independence. Secondly, the ability of FCA judges to request appointment provides a 
strong bulwark against judicial manipulation by removing the Chief Justice’s ability 
to ‘stack’ panels with judges that conform to his or her views.  
 
Although this voluntary appointments process may lead to concerns about non-
specialist judges ending up on specialist panels,148 this is managed by requiring judges 
to “accept a responsibility to become familiar with the area … [and] take an active 
part in regular judicial education programmes”.149 Not only are judges likely to take 
their judicial obligations seriously, but the requirement to conduct lectures is likely to 
deter non-specialist judges from requesting appointment to areas where they will be 
unable to perform their duties adequately.150  
 
                                               
146 Law Commission Delivering Justice for All, above n 103, at 265. 
147 Michael Black “The Federal Court of Australia: The First 30 Years – A Survey on the Occasion of 
Two Anniversaries” (2007) 31 Melbourne University Law Review 1017 at 1042. See also Law 
Commission Delivering Justice for All, above n 103, at 265.  
148 This was reflected in some of the concerns raised by practitioners in Caroline Sage, Ted Wright and 
Carolyn Morris Case Management Reform: A Study of the Federal Court’s Individual Docket System 
(Law and Justice Foundation of New South Wales, 2002) at 63. 
149 See Law Commission Delivering Justice for All, above n 103, at 265; and Black, above n 192, at 
1042. 
150 In 2003, “the Chief Justice describe[d] the advantages of the panel system as follows: 
a) it widens the specialist base of the court: the allocation of specialist cases within a panel 
substantially increases the chance of individual judges hearing a reasonable number of such 
cases, where if they were distributed randomly among the Melbourne and Sydney judges (of 
whom there are almost 30) the level of experience in specialist areas would drop 
b) the system promotes expertise 
c) it gives judges the opportunity to do work they like, and others the opportunity to avoid work 
they do not like. 
Letter from Michael Black (Chief Justice of the Federal Court of Australia) to Bruce Robertson 
(President of the Law Commission) regarding judicial specialisation (August 2003), cited in Law 
Commission Delivering Justice for All, above n 103 at 265. 
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The FCA’s second “distinctive” feature is its use of an individual docket system.151 
Introduced in 1997, cases are assigned, upon filing, by the registrar to a judge using a 
strictly rotational system, who is then given responsibility to manage the case from its 
commencement to disposal at trial.152 The aim of the system is to “promote more 
active and effective judicial case management … streamline processing, encourage 
early settlement and, overall, to dispose of cases more efficiently.153 Importantly, this 
system continues to apply to panel cases. Thus, where cases fall within the jurisdiction 
of a particular panel, the registrar simply assigns cases to panel judges on the same 
strictly rotational basis.154  
 
Although concerns have been raised about whether the use of a strictly rotational 
system has resulted in an equitable distribution of work,155 and whether it may be 
possible to ‘game’ the system by filing cases in a way which gets particular judges 
assigned,156 the overall view of the system is incredibly positive.157 
2 New South Wales 
 
One of the New South Wales Supreme Court’s most remarkable features is its 
longstanding history of commercial specialisation. In 1903, following the English 
Commercial Court’s lead, Bill Wise, New South Wales’ Attorney-General introduced 
the Commercial Causes Act. Designed to “provide a more expeditious method for the 
trial of commercial causes”, 158 the Act established a commercial list to deal with 
commercial disputes, and empowered list judges to dispense with procedural rules “in 
order to ensure the speedy determination of those issues.”159  
 
                                               
151 Sage, Wright and Morris, above n 148, at 169. See also Steven Rares “The Significance of the 
Commercial Jurisdiction of the Federal Court of Australia” (2008) 22 CLQ 25 at [37]. 
152 Sage, Wright and Morris, above n 148, from 57; Law Commission Delivering Justice for All, above 
n 103, at 265; and Rares, above n 151, at [37]. 
153 Sage, Wright and Morris, above n 148, at 169. See also Rares, above n 151, at [37]. 
154 Sage, Wright and Morris, above n 148, from 57, Law Commission Delivering Justice for All, above 
n 103, at 265; and Rares, above n 151, at [37]. 
155 Sage, Wright and Morris, above n 148, at 60. 
156 Sage, Wright and Morris, above n 148, at 59. 
157 Sage, Wright and Morris, above n 148, at 55 concluded that “the aims and goals of the Individual 
Docket System were being achieved”. They continued, “judges said that the greatest benefit … was 
increased control over their workload and time [whilst] practitioners generally considered that the new 
system had a positive impact on how they approached litigation”. 
158 Commercial Causes Act 1903 (NSW) long title. 
159 See J J Spigelman, Chief Justice of New South Wales, “Commercial Causes Centenary” (speech to 
the dinner held to celebrate 100 years since the commencement of the Commercial Causes Act 1903, 
Sydney, 6 November 2003) at 3. 
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Although “[t]he organisational structure for commercial litigation has [developed] 
from single judges administering an informal list, to a formal commercial list to a 
separate Commercial Division”,160 commercial specialisation is now provided through 
the commercial list in the Equity Division of the Supreme Court.161 
 
Like the English Commercial Court, the scope of New South Wales’ commercial list 
is extremely broad. Under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules, the commercial list has 
jurisdiction over all “proceedings arising out of commercial transactions” and 
“proceedings in which there is an issue that has importance in trade or commerce”.162  
 
However, reflecting the list’s structure, New South Wales judges are, at best, quasi-
specialist. Not only are judges appointed to multiple lists, but “the first claim on [their 
time] is the criminal business of the court”.163 Given that New South Wales has a 
population of more than 7 million, this indicates that specialisation within the New 
Zealand High Court would have to be done on a similar basis. 
 
One concern with the New South Wales list system is the means by which judges are 
appointed and dismissed. The Chief Justice of New South Wales has an untrammelled 
power to appoint judges (of either division) to a list,164 but more importantly, “may at 
any time … revoke a Judge’s designation as a List Judge.”165 As will be discussed 
later, in the context of the proposed reforms to New Zealand’s High Court, the risk, 
from placing the power of appointment and dismissal in the hands of one person, is 
that the Chief Justice may “panel pack” the list, in an attempt to manipulate the result 
of a case, or development of the law.166 In this regard, it potentially poses a substantial 
threat to the principle of individual judicial independence.167 
 
Nevertheless, the commercial list appears to be reasonably successful. Whilst the 
number of filings dropped between 2008 and 2012,168 this is consistent with a trend 
                                               
160 See Spigelman, above n 159, at 4. 
161 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), r 45.1. See also the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), s 
38. 
162 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), r 45.6(1). 
163 Law Commission 2012 Issues Paper, above n 32, at [7.48]. 
164 Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), s 28(1). 
165 Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), s 28(5). 
166 See generally Petra Butler “The Assignment of Cases to Judges” (2003) 1 NZJIL 83. 
167  See generally Simon Shetreet “Judicial independence and accountability: core values in liberal 
democracies” in H. P. Lee (ed) Judiciaries in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2011) 3. 
168  Supreme Court of New South Wales “2012 Annual Review” 
<www.supremecourt.lawlink.nsw.gov.au> at 57. 
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observed in other courts,169 as the world moves from recession to recovery. Instead, a 
more representative indication of the list’s success is the high number of cases 
awaiting trial, 170  indicating a strong demand for specialist dispute settlement. A 
further reason for this success may be the existence of the commercial list users 
committee which, like the English Commercial Court Users Committee, ensures a 
steady stream of dialogue between the court and practitioners. 
C Singapore 
 
As a common law jurisdiction with a population of 5.5 million,171 Singapore provides 
a particularly interesting comparison from a New Zealand perspective.  
 
With the limited exception of its Admiralty and Intellectual Property Courts, 
Singapore, like New Zealand, is a generalist jurisdiction.172 At present, all commercial 
disputes with a value exceeding S$250,000 fall within the jurisdiction of the 
Singapore High Court, where they are resolved by generalist judges.173 However, this 
is about to change significantly, with the proposed establishment of the Singapore 
International Commercial Court (SICC).174  
 
Although the final details are yet to be announced, the government hopes to create 
“the premium forum for court-based commercial dispute resolution both within and 
beyond Asia”,175 by establishing the SICC as a division of the High Court. Doing so 
will ensure maximum worldwide enforceability of its judgments,176 and enable it to 
exercise coercive powers when determining conflict of laws issues.177  
 
                                               
169 See, for example, Courts of New Zealand “Annual Statistics for the High Court December 2013” 
<www.courtsofnz.govt.nz>. 
170 See Supreme Court of New South Wales, above n 168, at 57. Between 2008 and 2012, the number 
of cases awaiting trial in the commercial list has remained above 280 – a large number when one 
considers that the court only disposed of 178 cases in 2012. 
171 Central Intelligence Agency “The World Factbook – Singapore” (20 June 2014) <www.cia.gov>.  
172 Supreme Court of Singapore “Our Courts” (3 July 2014) <app.supremecourt.gov.sg>. 
173 State Courts Act (Singapore, cap 321, 2007 rev ed), s 2(b).  
174 See, for example, Report of the Singapore International Commercial Court Committee (November 
2013) <www.mlaw.gov.sg>; and K Shanmugam, Singapore Minister for Law, “Addendum to the 
President’s Address to Parliament” (speech to the Parliament of Singapore, Singapore, 23 May 2014) at 
[8].  The Ministry of Law recently sought consultation on the proposed legislation to enact the SICC, 
see Ministry of Law “Draft Supreme Court of Judicature (Amendment) Bill 2014” (8 April 2014) 
<www.mlaw.gov.sg>. 
175 Report of the Singapore International Commercial Court Committee, above n 174, at 11. 
176 Report of the Singapore International Commercial Court Committee, above n 174, at 13. 
177 Report of the Singapore International Commercial Court Committee, above n 174, at 12. 
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More importantly, the Committee that proposed the SICC’s establishment, 
recommended several additional features to bolster the Court’s attractiveness to 
foreign litigants, all of which appear to have been accepted by the government. First, 
like the English Commercial Court, 178  parties will not need to show any link to 
Singapore before falling within the SICC’s jurisdiction. Instead, they simply need to 
establish that their dispute involves an issue of commercial law, as defined by the 
UNICTRAL Model Law,179 and a consensual agreement to resolve their case at the 
SICC, either before or after the dispute arose.180 
 
Secondly, there is no obligation to litigate disputes under Singapore law. Cases can be 
determined under the parties’ choice of law and, unlike other courts, there will be no 
requirement to plead, and prove, foreign law as fact.181 Instead, SICC judges will 
simply “take judicial notice of foreign law with the assistance of oral and written legal 
submissions, supported by relevant authorities.”182 Additionally, where disputes have 
no substantial connection to Singapore, 183  parties may be represented by foreign 
counsel, so long as they are registered with the SICC.184 
 
                                               
178 See Colman, Lyon and Hopkins, above n 119, at 27 – 28. 
179 Report of the Singapore International Commercial Court Committee, above n 174, at 14. The SICC 
Committee proposed using the definition of “commercial” under art 1(1) of the UNCITRAL Model 
Law on International Commercial Arbitration GA Res 61/33, A/61/17 (1985) which states “The term 
“commercial” should be given a wide interpretation so as to cover matters arising from all relationships 
of a commercial nature, whether contractual or not. Relationships of a commercial nature include, but 
are not limited to, the following transactions: any trade transaction for the supply or exchange of goods 
or services; distribution agreement; commercial representation or agency; factoring; leasing; 
construction of works; consulting; engineering; licensing; investment; financing; banking; insurance; 
exploitation agreement or concession; joint venture and other forms of industrial or business 
cooperation; carriage of goods or passengers by air, sea, rail or road.” 
180 Report of the Singapore International Commercial Court Committee, above n 174, at 13 – 14. This 
was summarised at 5 where they stated “[the] SICC will deal with three categories of cases, where (i) 
parties have consented to using the SICC post-dispute; (ii) disputants are parties to a contract giving the 
SICC jurisdiction over any disputes arising out of that contract; and (iii) cases within the Singapore 
High Court’s jurisdiction which are transferred to the SICC by the Chief Justice.” 
181 Report of the Singapore International Commercial Court Committee, above n 174, at 17. 
182 Report of the Singapore International Commercial Court Committee, above n 174, at 17. 
183 “What constitutes the absence of substantial connection will be further refined in consultation with 
stakeholders, but will include cases in which either (i) Singapore law is not the governing law; or (ii) 
the choice of Singapore law is the sole connection to Singapore” Report of the Singapore International 
Commercial Court Committee, above n 174, at 19. 
184 Report of the Singapore International Commercial Court Committee, above n 174, at 19. This is not 
designed to be an onerous task, with foreign lawyers simply required to provide a business address and 
undertake to abide by a set of ethical rules. 
 WILLIAM STEEL – LAWS 522 
 38 
Thirdly, whilst proceedings will ordinarily “take place in open court”,185 special rules 
will apply where the dispute is being resolved under foreign law, or where the “choice 
of Singapore law is the sole connection to Singapore”.186 In such cases, where all 
parties agree that the dispute shall be confidential, hearings will be conducted in 
camera, and judgments will be redacted. 187  If parties fail to agree on the 
confidentiality of proceedings, SICC judges retain the discretion to make any orders 
according to any private interest in confidentiality, and the public interest in open and 
transparent justice.188  
 
However, it is the Court’s use of international judges and a specialist Court of Appeal 
that sets it apart from its competitors. Although the SICC will be a division of the 
High Court, cases will be assigned by the Chief Justice to specialist commercial 
judges appointed to the SICC panel.189 Significantly, SICC judges are not required to 
be Singaporean. Where the Chief Justice desires, international judges can be 
appointed to the SICC panel “for a fixed period, and then assigned cases on an ad hoc 
basis.”190 Unlike their Singaporean counterparts, international judges will not have 
security of tenure, and will be paid according to “an agreed rate based on the number 
of days required for the specific case.”191 Nonetheless, their availability is likely to be 
a key drawcard for foreign commercial litigants.  
 
The Court’s second defining feature is the right of appeal to a specialist Court of 
Appeal made up of three judges from the SICC panel. 192  This continuation of 
specialisation to the Court of Appeal (the highest court in the Singaporean hierarchy) 
represents a selling point unmatched by the English Commercial Court or the 
Commercial Division of the New York Supreme Court.193   
                                               
185 Report of the Singapore International Commercial Court Committee, above n 174, at 17. 
186 Report of the Singapore International Commercial Court Committee, above n 174, at 17. 
187 Report of the Singapore International Commercial Court Committee, above n 174, at 17. 
188 Report of the Singapore International Commercial Court Committee, above n 174, at 17.  
189 Report of the Singapore International Commercial Court Committee, above n 174, at 13. 
190 Report of the Singapore International Commercial Court Committee, above n 174, at 13. 
191 Report of the Singapore International Commercial Court Committee, above n 174, at 13. 
192 Report of the Singapore International Commercial Court Committee, above n 174, at 18. Unlike its 
New Zealand counterpart, the Singapore Court of Appeal sits at the top of the judicial hierarchy.  
193  See The Chief Judge’s Task Force on Commercial Litigation in the 21st Century Report and 
Recommendations to the Chief Judge of the State of New York (June 2012) <www.nycourts.gov> at 21 
which stated that: “The Appellate Divisions and Court of Appeals are vital to the development of 
commercial law in New York State. The liberal availability of interlocutory appeals from Commercial 
Division rulings is rare among competitor courts and is generally considered by practitioners to be 
beneficial. But even as a number of former Commercial Division Justices have been added to the 
Appellate Divisions in recent years, the increasingly complex nature of some commercial litigation 
appeals may warrant reforms to the appellate process.” 
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Whilst the appointment of international judges on an ad hoc basis raises legitimate 
questions around a lack of judicial independence,194 this is less worrying than it would 
be in most municipal courts because the SICC does not have a monopoly over its 
‘clients’. Where foreign litigants believe, or at least perceive, that their case will not 
be resolved fairly, then they are highly unlikely to agree to the SICC’s jurisdiction. In 
other words, market forces are likely to ensure an independent and impartial judiciary. 
Moreover, because the international judges are likely to be well known and respected, 
this should help to assuage any further concerns of partiality and corruption. 
 
Remarkably, even though many of the procedural details are yet to be announced, the 
SICC appears highly likely to succeed. In a briefing to its clients, one of the world’s 
leading law firms, Clifford Chance, described “the proposed SICC [a]s a 
masterstroke. The idea is at once bold, visionary and entrepreneurial.” 195  It 
continued:196 
 
The rationale behind the proposal is compelling … Singapore, with its well-
developed legal system, world class infrastructure and "trusted hub status", is 
ideally positioned to become Asia's premier dispute resolution hub to handle the 
expected growth in complex, high value, multi-jurisdictional commercial and 
investment disputes. 
 
Indeed, to the extent that the SICC develops a strong reputation, New Zealand 
businesses may choose to resolve their disputes in Singapore, posing an additional 
threat to the development of New Zealand’s commercial law.  
D Cayman Islands 
 
With a population of less than 55,000,197 and a GDP of just US$3.1 billion,198 the 
Cayman Islands is, perhaps, an unlikely candidate for judicial specialisation. 
Nonetheless, since its inception on 2 November 2009, the Financial Services Division 
                                               
194 For a discussion of the concerns raised by ad hoc appointments in the New Zealand context see Law 
Commission 2012 Issues Paper, above n 32, at [3.55] – [3.83]. 
195 Clifford Chance “Briefing Note: The Singapore International Commercial Court – A Masterstroke” 
(17 December 2013) <www.cliffordchance.com> at 1. 
196 Clifford Chance, above n 195, at 2. 
197  Central Intelligence Agency “The World Factbook – Cayman Islands” (20 June 2014) 
<www.cia.gov>. 
198 Gabriel Torres and others “Credit Analysis of the Government of the Cayman Islands” (5 December 
2013) Moody’s Investors Service <www.moodys.com> at 11. 
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(FSD) of the Grand Court (equivalent to New Zealand’s High Court) has become 
increasingly important, dealing with hundreds of cases every year.199 
 
Although the FSD has a more limited focus than the SICC and the English 
Commercial Court, the definition of “financial services proceedings” is relatively 
broad, and includes any proceedings against a mutual fund, its directors, trustees, and 
managers; insurance claims; trust and partnership claims; professional negligence 
actions; and arbitral appeals.200 In this regard, it cannot properly be considered a 
commercial court. Nevertheless, given the Cayman Islands’ status as a “thriving 
offshore financial centre”,201 the FSD has essentially become the Islands’ de facto 
commercial court, dealing with the majority of commercial disputes on the islands.202  
 
Like the FCA, the FSD uses an individual docket system. Cases are assigned, upon 
filing, by the FSD’s registrar, in consultation with the Chief Justice,203 to an FSD 
judge, who will “adjudicate the trial of the matter and every interlocutory application 
arising before or after the trial of the matter.”204 This procedure accomplishes two 
goals. First, it reduces the risk of judicial manipulation 205  by ensuring that an 
independent registrar allocates cases amongst the commercial judges, whilst 
guaranteeing some judicial involvement through the need to consult with the Chief 
Justice.  Secondly, the docket system allows the judge to become more intimately 
involved in the case, forcing the parties to concentrate on key issues and facts, and 
allowing for an expedited interlocutory and trial process.206  
 
At present, there are 7 FSD judges, with appointments made by the Cayman Islands 
Governor, on the advice of the Judicial and Legal Services Commission.207 Like the 
SICC, there is no requirement for FSD judges to be from the Cayman Islands. Instead, 
applications can be made from lawyers throughout the Commonwealth, provided that 
                                               
199  Cayman Islands Judicial Administration “Judicial and Court Statistics 2004-2013” (20 January 
2014) Cayman Islands Judicial and Legal Information Website <www.judicial.ky>. 
200 Cayman Islands Grand Court Rules 1995 (Revised Edition 1 July 2013) O.72, r. 1(2). 
201 Central Intelligence Agency, above n 281. 
202 Jeremy Walton “Guide to the Legal System in the Cayman Islands” (September 2013) Appleby 
Global <www.applebyglobal.com> at 4. For this reason, judges in the FSD are officially called 
“commercial judges”. See Cayman Islands Grand Court Rules 1995 (Revised Edition 1 July 2013) O.5, 
r. 1(7). 
203 Cayman Islands Grand Court Rules 1995 (Revised Edition 1 July 2013) O.5, r. 1(7). 
204 Cayman Islands Grand Court Rules 1995 (Revised Edition 1 July 2013) O.4, r. 2(2). 
205 For a more detailed discussion see Butler, above n 166. 
206 Marit Hudson “The Cayman Grand Court’s Financial Services Division: A Progress Report” (April 
2011) Appleby Global <www.appleby.com> at 1. 
207 The Constitution of the Cayman Islands, s 106(1). See also Ian Hendry and Susan Dickson British 
Overseas Territories Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2011) from 98. 
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they have been qualified for over ten years.208 Interestingly, whilst full-time judges of 
the Grand Court may also be appointed to the FSD part-time, Associate Judges can be 
appointed to sit solely in the FSD.209  
 
The result is a highly successful commercial court, in a very small common law 
jurisdiction.210 Although it costs CI$15,000 (approximately NZ$21,000) to lodge a 
case in the FSD,211 more than 150 cases have been filed every year since its inception 
– a substantial number given that only 480 civil cases were filed in 2008, the year 
before the FSD was established.212  
E Summary 
 
As can be seen from this brief review of just four jurisdictions and five courts, the 
manner and degree of specialisation is varied. At one extreme, Singapore’s planned 
SICC involves a specialist court comprised of a mixture of domestic and foreign 
judges, with appeals going to a specialist Court of Appeal. At the other end sits the 
New South Wales Supreme Court’s specialist lists, staffed by quasi-specialist judges 
who are still expected to hear a variety of cases outside their specialist areas. 
Nonetheless, from this variety, several conclusions can be drawn.  
 
First, the extent of any court’s specialist jurisdiction is a policy decision that must be 
made on a country-by-country basis according to both the needs of the commercial 
community, and the available judicial resources. It would be inappropriate, therefore, 
for the government to simply adopt another court’s specialist model in the hope that it 
will work in the New Zealand context. 
 
Secondly, apart from the SICC, all judges are expected to work outside their specialist 
area. If England’s specialist judges are not required to work full-time in the 
Commercial Court, then one can hardly expect that New Zealand will have sufficient 
cases to justify a separate court staffed by wholly specialist judges. Specialisation, 
therefore, must be within the existing High Court structure.  
 
                                               
208 Cayman Islands Government “Job Description – Grand Court Judge, Financial Services Division” 
Judicial and Legal Services Commission <www.judicialandlegalservicescommission.ky> at 3. 
209 Cayman Islands Government “Job Description – Grand Court Judge, Financial Services Division 
(Part-time)” Judicial and Legal Services Commission <www.judicialandlegalservicescommission.ky> 
at 1. 
210 See Hudson, above n 206, at 1; and Peter Hayden “Holding Court” (2010) 160 NLJ 182.  
211 Cayman Islands Court Fees Rules 2009, sch 1, pt B. 
212 Grand Court of the Cayman Islands “Judicial and Court Statistics 2004 – 2013” (20 January 2014) 
Cayman Islands Judicial and Legal Information Website <www.judicial.ky>. 
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In saying this, it is clear that there must be scope for specialist divisions or panels to 
adopt their own procedures, independently of the existing High Court rules. As the 
English Commercial Court’s experience in the 1960s reveals, the existence of 
specialist judges is only a minor part of the picture. Specialisation only succeeds if the 
court procedures underpinning it reflect the commercial community’s requirements.  
 
Finally, specialisation must be seen as a dynamic process. As the continuous reforms 
of the New South Wales commercial list and English Commercial Court reveal, the 
business community’s needs change over time. At the very least, New Zealand should 
establish a court user committee, to ensure a steady stream of dialogue between 
judges and court participants. 
 
VI The potential effects of specialisation in New Zealand 
 
Although specialisation has been successful in other countries, this provides only a 
limited guarantee as to its success in New Zealand. Accordingly, this section briefly 
considers the costs and benefits of specialisation, before highlighting some additional 
features that must be considered if specialisation is to be introduced to the Zealand 
High Court.  
A General advantages and disadvantages of specialisation 
1 Advantages offered by specialisation 
 
As Adam Smith observed in 1776, increased familiarity breeds increased 
efficiency.213 Whereas generalist judges require time and effort to bring themselves 
‘up to speed’, specialist judges will already have a solid background knowledge of 
either the law or facts, driving several efficiency gains.214 As Michael Black, a former 
FCA Chief Justice, argued:215 
 
No doubt we can all work out the right result if we have time, but where a 
decision in a technical area has to be made on the spot … it is best to have a 
judge who can give the case the immediate, almost instinctive, attention that it 
requires. 
 
                                               
213 See generally Adam Smith An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776). 
214 For example Galbraith, above n 1, at 537; and Edward K Cheng “The Myth of the Generalist Judge” 
(2008) 61 Stan L Rev 519 at 549. 
215 Letter from Michael Black (Chief Justice of the Federal Court of Australia) to Bruce Robertson 
(President of the Law Commission) regarding judicial specialisation (August 2003), cited in Law 
Commission Delivering Justice for All, above n 103, at 266. 
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Where the judge already has an intimate knowledge of the law and issues involved, 
trials will become shorter, and judgments released more quickly, significantly 
reducing the transaction costs associated with litigation. This benefits both litigants 
and the state, as specialist judges can handle larger caseloads, shortening the time 
taken to get a case before court, and reducing the need to appoint more judges.216 
 
Specialists are also said to write better quality judgments, containing fewer 
“accidental errors.” 217  Instead of seeking background explanations, a specialist’s 
ability to ask both counsel and expert witnesses questions that go right to the heart of 
an issue, is likely to result in quality judgments that accurately balance policy 
considerations, and accord with the parties’ expectations.218  
 
Furthermore, specialist judgments often benefit from increased legitimacy, compared 
to their generalist counterparts. As one commentator observed, “[to] the extent that 
the opinion makes difficult trade-offs, affected parties may defer more to an expert’s 
judgment under the assumption that the judge ‘understands’ the stakes and the 
complexities of the field or industry.”219 As a result, judgments are less likely to be 
appealed, further reducing parties’ litigation costs.220 
 
Finally, specialisation is likely to foster consistency as fewer judges have a greater 
influence on the law and its development. 221  In turn, this consistency facilitates 
commerce by reducing commercial parties’ transaction costs (both in developing a 
framework to avoid legal liability, and also helping parties to come to an agreement if 
a dispute arises).222 This may be reinforced through the development of a specialist 
bar, which has the potential to create further efficiencies.223   
2 Disadvantages of specialisation 
 
On the other hand, whilst specialist courts and judges may create a uniform and 
consistent body of case law, this is accompanied by a strong risk of stagnation. As the 
                                               
216 Cheng, above n 214, at 549. 
217 David Currie and Frank Goodman “Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action: Quest for the 
Optimum Forum” (1975) 75 Colum L Rev 1 at 67. 
218 Glazebrook, above n 7, at 537. See also Galbraith, above n 1, at 422. 
219 Cheng, above n 214, at 549. 
220 Galbraith, above n 1, at 422. 
221 Glazebrook, above n 7, at 537. See also Currie and Goodman, above n 217, at 63 
222 Richardson, above n 1, at 129 and 133; and Galbraith, above n 1, at 420. For further discussion of 
this issue see Kerr, above n 51.  
223 Glazebrook, above n 7, at 537. See also Grant, above n 58, where he argues that “[s]pecialist Courts 
attract specialist advocates and there is greater confidence for people to make use of such Courts.” 
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Chief Justice of Australia, Robert French, stated “one of [law’s greatest] strengths … 
is the facility it offers to cross-fertilise concepts and approaches from one area to 
another.”224 The fear is that specialist judges risk losing sight of legal developments 
outside their particular field, resulting in arcane rulings, and decisions which fail to 
reflect societal developments.225 
 
This concern is amplified due to the “danger that a specialised panel which is too 
small and specialised may create a ‘club’ culture, promote a matching mythology of 
expertise among the profession, encourage monopolies and contain jurisprudence.”226 
Faced with a small, and often deferential, specialist bar, specialist judges may become 
even more insular in their thinking, failing to consider the effects of their ruling on 
other areas of the law.227 
 
This has further consequences if specialist judges become emboldened, assertive or 
actively contemptuous. To the extent that specialist judges believe that the generalist 
Court of Appeal or Supreme Court is less knowledgeable than themselves, they may 
develop a “tendency to accord less authority” to the judicial hierarchy.228 Ironically, 
this may lead to uncertainty if specialist judges actively seek to avoid following 
appellate court decisions that they consider to be incorrectly decided.  
 
Another frequently cited concern is the increased threat of interest group 
manipulation, or special interest capture.229 This manifests itself in two forms. First, 
because specialisation may lead to “the development of excessively comfortable 
relationships between judges and members of the specialist bar”,230 there is a risk of 
judicial capture, with a small group of lawyers wielding substantial influence. 
                                               
224 Jeremy Curthoys “In Conversation with Justice Robert French” (2002) 50 Intellectual Property 
Forum 6 at 8. See also Cheng, above n 214, at 553; Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss “Specialized 
Adjudication” [1990] BYU L Rev 377 at 379; and Currie and Goodman, above n 217, at 68. For a 
contrary view see Jeffrey W Stempel “Two Cheers for Specialization” (1995) 61 Brook L Rev 67 at 96. 
225 See Cheng, above n 214, at 552; and Lawrence Baum “Probing the Effects of Judicial Specialization 
(2009) 58 Duke LJ 1667 at 1678. 
226  Australian Law Reform Commission Managing Justice: A Review of the Federal Civil Justice 
System (ALRC 89, 2000) at [7.24]. 
227 See, for example, Baum, above n 225, at 1679; and Ellen Jordan “Specialized Courts: A Choice?” 
(1981) 76 Northwestern University Law Review 745 at 747 – 748. 
228 Baum, above n 225, at 1678. 
229 Baum, above n 225, at 1677; and Jordan, above n 227, at 747 – 748; Glazebrook, above n 7, at 538; 
Cheng, above n 214, at 551 – 552; and Dreyfuss, above n 224, at 379. 
230 Curthoys, above n 224, at 8. See also Baum, above n 225, at 1679. 
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Secondly, if a small category of litigants will often appear before the court, they have 
a strong incentive to lobby for the appointment of judges favourable to their cause.231  
 
Finally, specialisation comes with increased financial costs. Litigants may engage in 
jurisdictional conflicts in an attempt to get their case in or out of a specialist court, 
whilst the courts themselves need to be staffed and well resourced.232 Given New 
Zealand’s relatively small economy, these costs may outweigh any efficiency benefits 
specialisation provides. 
B Further considerations 
 
The difficulty, however, that one faces when examining these considerations is that 
“[t]he existing scholarship provides only a fragmentary understanding of the extent to 
which the potential effects of judicial specialisation – positive, negative, or mixed – 
actually occur.”233 Moreover, the extent and relevance of many of these factors is 
enormously dependent upon the form of specialisation introduced. Thus, even if 
certain effects can be shown in relation to one court, there is little guarantee that these 
will eventuate in another situation.  
 
Nevertheless, there are two key considerations that are of particular importance to the 
current commercial specialisation debate. First, New Zealand is not a large country. It 
has a limited pool of judicial resources, and only so many commercial disputes. 
Accordingly, any attempt to introduce a commercial court or specialist panel must 
define the scope of its jurisdiction in a way which, first, protects it against sudden 
fluctuations234 and, secondly, is sufficiently narrow so as to enable the efficiency 
gains from specialisation to be realised.  
 
This is of added importance if the specialisation occurs at High Court level for several 
reasons. First, High Court judges are not cheap. In a figure that has undoubtedly risen 
since its 2006 calculation, it was estimated that each High Court judge costs in excess 
of $630,000 per annum.235 Moreover, due to their guaranteed security of tenure,236 
                                               
231 Cheng, above n 214, at 551; and Sarang Vijay Damle “Specialize the Judge, Not the Court: A 
Lesson from the German Constitutional Court” (2005) 91 Va L Rev 1267 at 1283. 
232 Glazebrook, above n 7, at 539. See also Law Commission 2012 Issues Paper, above n 32, at [7.45] – 
[7.46]; and Trevor Daya-Winterbottom “Specialist Courts and Tribunals” (2004) 12 Waikato L Rev 21 
at 45. 
233 Baum, above n 225, at 1680. 
234 Cheng, above n 214, at 555. See also Katz, above n 1, at 44. 
235 See John Hansen, Judge of the High Court of New Zealand “Courts Administration, the Judiciary 
and the Efficient Delivery of Justice” (F.W. Guest Memorial Lecture, Otago University, Dunedin, 28 
September 2006) at 1: “It is estimated that each High Court Judge, with necessary support staff, 
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they cannot be removed even if there is insufficient work to justify their appointment. 
Accordingly, if judges were appointed, on the basis of their commercial experience, to 
a court or panel that subsequently failed to attract cases, the government will be 
required to bear the expense of an unwanted, and expensive, judicial asset. On the 
other hand, if the introduction of a specialist court leads to a substantial influx of 
commercial cases, this may place pressure on the current statutory limit of 55 
judges, 237  potentially resulting in delays to non-commercial cases, if insufficient 
judges are assigned to sit on regular civil and criminal trials. 
 
Secondly, the judicial specialisation debate needs to be seen in context. Since the 
Supreme Court’s establishment in 1841, New Zealand’s judiciary has been 
characterised by its generalist nature. The High Court has never sat in divisions238 and 
its judges have successfully withstood numerous calls for increased judicial 
specialisation throughout its history.239 The danger is that once New Zealand goes 
down the path of specialisation, it will be very difficult to return to a generalist 
structure.  
 
Take, for example, the Maori Land Court. With a heritage dating back to 1862,240 the 
Court was established “to ensure ownership, use and disposal of Maori land.”241  
Although its function shifted from facilitating European purchase of Maori land 
during the 19th century, to resolving disputes between Maori with collective 
ownership of land, by 1980 a Royal Commission, considered that “its life [was] 
running out.”242  In a view shared by “most, if not all of those with the greatest 
knowledge and experience of the Court”,243 the Commission reported that:244 
                                                                                                                                      
premises, library etc., costs the taxpayer in excess of $630,000 per year, but this ignores the 
superannuation contribution and the capital setup costs on appointment.” 
236 Constitution Act 1986, s 23. 
237 Judicature Act 1908, s 4(1)(b). This limit is set to be reaffirmed by s 6A(1) of the Judicature 
Modernisation Bill. 
238 I accept that the High Court’s Administrative Division operated between 1968 and 1991, however, 
this is more akin to a specialist panel, rather than a division. This can be contrasted with the formal 
separation between the Chancery, Queen’s Bench and Family divisions in the England and Wales High 
Court, and the Common Law and Equity divisions in the New South Wales Supreme Court.  
239 See for example Report of the Royal Commission on the Courts, above n 30, at 90 – 97; and Law 
Commission 2012 Review of the Judicature Act 1908, above n 34, at [10.3] – [10.16]. 
240 Te Kooti Whenua Maori “Maori Land Court” <www.justice.govt.nz>. 
241 Thaddeus McCarthy and others Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry on the Maori Land 
Court (Wellington, Government Printer, 1980) at 3. 
242 Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry on the Maori Land Court, above n 241, at 6. 
243 Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry on the Maori Land Court, above n 241, at 74. 
244 Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry on the Maori Land Court, above n 241, at 74 (emphasis 
added). 
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It is hard to see that a separate court will be needed to do the remaining judicial 
work which could then perhaps be handled within the central court structure … 
 
Nevertheless, more than 30 years on, the Maori Land Court remains in existence, 
providing a vivid example of just how difficult it can be to remove a specialist panel 
or court.  
 
This concern is two-fold. First, any move to introduce a specialist commercial panel, 
division or court is likely to result in lobbying for further specialisation in other legal 
areas. Taken to an extreme, this may result in the division of the Court’s jurisdiction 
into a series of panels, as has happened with the FCA. Secondly, even if the specialist 
commercial panel, division or court failed to live up to expectations it may, as the 
Maori Land Court shows, prove very difficult to remove.  
 
Unfortunately, as the following sections reveal, neither the government nor the Law 
Commission considered these factors in any detail when designing the proposed 
reform under clause 18 of the Judicature Modernisation Bill.  
 
VII The Judicature Modernisation Bill 
A Law Commission report 
 
In its 2012 Review of the Judicature Act 1908, the Law Commission strongly 
supported the introduction of a specialist High Court commercial panel. 
Unfortunately, as this paper reveals, the Commission’s reasons for change are unable 
to withstand scrutiny, whilst its lack of detailed recommendations on the proposed 
panel’s operation has led to many of the problems created by clause 18 of the 
Judicature Modernisation Bill.  
1 The rationale for change 
 
Two factors underpinned the Commission’s decision to recommend greater High 
Court specialisation: the failure of the commercial list, and a perceived loss of 
commercial litigation. Neither provides a solid basis for the Commission’s 
recommendations.  
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(a) Commercial List’s failure 
 
Introduced by the government in 1987, the commercial list provides for commercial 
judges, as appointed by the Chief Justice, to determine the parties’ pre-trial 
applications, with a view to identifying the main issues and reducing the scope of the 
substantive dispute.245 Although the list initially proved popular, its case load declined 
substantially over the past decade, leading the Commission to conclude that it had 
“[lost] its purpose”,246 and was “slowly falling into disuse.”247 Three factors were seen 
as contributing to the list’s demise. 
 
First, and most importantly, the commercial list suffered from a “fundamental 
weakness” 248  in that it only addresses pre-trial applications. Following the 
determination of pre-trial issues, cases returned to the general list, where there was no 
guarantee of a commercial judge determining the substantive dispute.249  
 
Secondly, the introduction of general case management250 significantly reduced the 
list’s procedural benefits, to the point whereby quintessentially commercial disputes 
were potentially refused entry onto the list due to “disadvantages [of] cost and 
convenience.”251  
 
Finally, because the list only operates in Auckland, 252  this led to substantial and 
“unjustified” increases in cost and travel for litigants based elsewhere. 253  This is 
“particularly [unsatisfactory] given that some of the significant commercial litigation 
is against Crown entities, which are usually based in Wellington.”254  
 
 
                                               
245 Law Commission 2012 Review of the Judicature Act 1908, above n 34, at [7.4]. See also Andrew 
Beck “Do we need the Commercial List?” [2002] NZLJ 441. 
246 Law Commission 2012 Issues Paper, above n 32, at [7.14]. 
247 Law Commission 2012 Issues Paper, above n 32, at [7.34]. 
248 Law Commission 2012 Issues Paper, above n 32, at [7.31]. See also Galbraith, above n 1, at 424. 
249 Law Commission 2012 Issues Paper, above n 32, at [7.31]. Indeed, the Law Commission went 
further and stated “having got the case ready for hearing … to then beat a retreat to the general list 
along with a myriad of other cases is inappropriate.” 
250 For further discussion see Winkelmann and others, above n 104.  
251 Law Commission 2012 Issues Paper, above n 32, at [7.13] – [7.20]. For further discussion of this 
issue see Commerce Commission v Cards NZ Ltd HC Auckland CIV-2006-485-2535, 5 April 2007 at 
[12] – [15]; and Beck, above n 245, at 442. 
252 This has recently changed with judges based in the Wellington High Court being appointed to the 
commercial list in 2011. See Winkelmann “2013 High Court Annual Report”, above n 72, at 4. 
253 Law Commission 2012 Issues Paper, above n 32, at [7.32]. 
254 Law Commission 2012 Issues Paper, above n 32, at [7.32]. 
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(b) Loss of litigation 
 
The Commission also concluded that the commercial list’s failure, coupled with 
ADR’s rising popularity, had led to a “respectable ‘bleeding off’ of commercial 
litigation” in New Zealand. 255  Acting as a catalyst for change, the Commission 
concluded that, without reform, “[it] is difficult not to see that trend continuing”.256 
 
(c) Criticism 
 
Whilst it is undoubtedly true that the commercial list has “[lost] its purpose”,257 and is 
“slowly falling into disuse”,258 this does not mean that commercial litigation is not 
going to the High Court. Instead, all that one can say is that commercial parties no 
longer see any use for a procedure that assigns a specialist judge to manage a case’s 
pre-trial applications, but returns it to the general list for the substantive hearing. 
 
Secondly, there is no empirical evidence to support the Commission’s conclusion that 
“there has been a respectable ‘bleeding off’ of civil litigation”259 Nor, is there any 
basis for the Commission’s statement that, without reform, “[it] is difficult not to see 
that trend continuing”.260 In effect, the Commission never even satisfied the first of 
the three criteria established earlier in this paper, let alone showed that the ‘lost’ 
litigation was being resolved offshore or in ADR, and the substantial reason for this 
was the High Court’s lack of specialisation. 
1 Commercial panels 
 
Nevertheless, following its conclusion that change was required, the Commission 
examined four options for reform: (a) abolish the commercial list; (b) extend the 
commercial list to Wellington and Christchurch, and cover substantive hearings; (c) 
create a specialist commercial court in Auckland; or (d) introduce a High Court panel 
system.261  
 
                                               
255 Law Commission 2012 Review of the Judicature Act 1908, above n 34, at [10.54] 
256 Law Commission 2012 Review of the Judicature Act 1908, above n 34, at [10.55]. 
257 Law Commission 2012 Issues Paper, above n 32, at [7.14]. 
258 Law Commission 2012 Issues Paper, above n 32, at 7.34. 
259 Law Commission 2012 Review of the Judicature Act 1908, above n 34, at [10.54] 
260 Law Commission 2012 Review of the Judicature Act 1908, above n 34, at [10.55]. 
261 Law Commission 2012 Issues Paper, above n 32, at [7.29]. 
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Whilst an expanded commercial list, and specialist commercial court were considered 
to offer some benefits,262 the Law Commission strongly favoured the introduction of a 
panel system for the following reasons. 
 
First, the prospect of trial court specialisation garnered widespread enthusiasm 
amongst commercial parties and their lawyers. In particular, the New Zealand Law 
Society’s strong support for a commercial panel263 was echoed by the results of a New 
Zealand Bar Association survey which found that 84% of its members supported 
judicial specialisation of some form.264  
 
Secondly, the Commission concluded that a panel system, which had received 
“general support”265 in Australia, represented a “pragmatic half-way house between 
an (unaffordable) commercial court and a wholly generalist jurisdiction.”266 
 
Finally, whilst the Commission accepted that there was no practical difference 
between a commercial panel, and extending the commercial list to cover substantive 
disputes, “it is the scope to develop further panels in the panel system that sets them 
apart, and makes us inclined to prefer it.” 267  As noted earlier, this statement is 
particularly concerning when viewed in light of the High Court’s longstanding history 
as a generalist court, and the difficulties one faces when attempting to remove 
specialist panels and Courts. 
 
2 Lack of recommendations 
 
Unfortunately, having reached its conclusion, the Commission provided little 
guidance on the size, composition and scope of the proposed commercial panel, 
stating that this would “need to be settled”. 268  Underpinning the Commission’s 
reluctance to offer detailed recommendations was its (unexplained) belief that 
legislation should simply provide for the Attorney-General, in consultation with the 
                                               
262 Law Commission 2012 Issues Paper, above n 32, at [7.36] – [7.46]. 
263 Law Commission 2012 Review of the Judicature Act 1908, above n 34, at [10.39]. 
264 Law Commission 2012 Review of the Judicature Act 1908, above n 34, at [10.29]. 
265 Law Commission 2012 Review of the Judicature Act 1908, above n 34, at [10.37]. 
266 New Zealand Law Society “Submission to the Law Commission on the Review of the Judicature Act 
1908” quoted in Law Commission 2012 Review of the Judicature Act 1908, above n 34, at [10.39]. 
Further supported by the Law Commission 2012 Issues Paper, above n 32, at [7.40] – [7.60]. 
267 Law Commission 2012 Issues Paper, above n 32, at [7.60]. 
268 Law Commission 2012 Review of the Judicature Act 1908, above n 34, at [10.68]. 
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Chief High Court Judge (CHCJ), to establish the commercial panel through 
subsequent Orders in Council.269 This is highly unsatisfactory for two reasons.  
 
First, having discussed the current problems facing New Zealand’s judiciary, the 
Commission effectively abdicated any responsibility for improving the situation. 
Take, for example, the two major features of any commercial panel: the scope of its 
jurisdiction, and the membership of its judges.270 Both features are likely to be of 
paramount importance to any panel’s success. If the panel’s scope is too narrow, or 
the appointed judges lack the requisite expertise or experience, the panel is likely to 
fail. Yet the Commission never addressed the issue of judicial appointment/selection, 
and only briefly commented on the panel’s scope by suggesting that the London 
Commercial Court’s jurisdiction would be “a useful starting point for 
consideration”.271  
 
Like suggesting a cake but without providing the recipe, the result is a solution that is 
entirely lacking in substance. There is no guarantee of an improved civil litigation 
environment, or even an improvement upon the existing commercial list. 272  In 
contrast, had the Commission attempted to define the commercial panel’s jurisdiction, 
and set guidelines around its operation, commercial parties, lawyers and judges would 
have had an opportunity to comment and suggest improvements, dramatically 
increasing the likelihood of successful reform. 
 
Secondly, the Commission’s failure to provide distinct recommendations effectively 
forestalled detailed Parliamentary scrutiny of the panel’s scope and operation. The 
problem is neatly encapsulated by Phil Goff MP during the Bill’s first reading when 
he stated: “[my] experience of the Law Commission is that it does its homework … 
and that we can be confident that the basis of this legislation will be sound.”273  
 
Faced with a Bill over 1,000 pages long, in an area unlikely to draw much, if any, 
public attention, it would appear that MPs treated the Law Commission’s report with 
                                               
269 Law Commission 2012 Review of the Judicature Act 1908, above n 34, at [10.67]. 
270 See, for example, Stephen Legomsky Specialized Justice: Courts, Administrative Tribunals, and a 
Cross-National Theory of Specialization (Oxford University Press, New York, 1990) at 33 – 38. 
271 Law Commission 2012 Review of the Judicature Act 1908, above n 34, at [10.68]. 
272 See, for example, Ministry of Justice Report of the Ministry of Justice to the Justice and Electoral 
Committee on the Judicature Modernisation Bill (April 2014) at [61] which “recommend[s] that the 
panel approach set out in [clause 18] be retained. Even though submitters’ support for a commercial 
panel was divided, this mechanism will assist the High Court to be most relevant to its users. This aids 
the legitimacy of the Court, regardless of whether there is any real difference in decision-making.” 
(emphasis added). 
273 (5 December 2013) 695 NZPD 15311. 
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deference, focusing instead upon areas where the government differed from the 
Commission.274 This has resulted in a failure to consider the potentially serious issues, 
as detailed below, which may result from the Bill’s current ‘bare bones’ approach.  
B The Judicature Modernisation Bill 
 
Following its introduction on 27 November 2013, the Judicature Modernisation Bill 
has attracted wide cross-party support, passing its first reading unanimously, and 
‘sailing’ through the Select Committee with limited alterations. Barring any 
significant changes of heart, the Bill is likely to progress into law when Parliament 
resumes following the September election. Accordingly, the current formulation of 
clause 18, as amended by the Select Committee,275 is of considerable importance.  
 
18 Panels 
(1) The commercial panel of the High Court from which Judges may be selected 
to hear and determine commercial proceedings is established and may 
operate subject to this section. 
(2) The Governor-General may, by Order in Council made on the 
recommendation of the Attorney-General after consultation with the Chief 
Justice and the Chief High Court Judge,— 
(a) specify a commencement date for the operation of the commercial 
panel: 
(b) specify the types of proceedings that may be assigned to the 
commercial panel: 
(c) if the Governor-General considers it necessary, provide for the 
commercial panel to cease its operations on or from a specified date. 
(3) The Chief High Court Judge, in consultation with the Attorney-General and 
the Chief Justice, may establish other panels of High Court Judges for the 
purposes of dealing with proceedings other than commercial proceedings. 
(4) The Chief High Court Judge may determine how many High Court Judges 
are to be on the commercial panel or any other panel and assign Judges to the 
panels. 
(5) The Chief High Court Judge may decide the basis on which cases are to be 
distributed as between Judges on the commercial panel or another panel and 
Judges who are not on any panel. 
                                               
274 For example (5 December 2013) 695 NZPD 15312 per Phil Goff (Labour).  
275 The only change made by the Select Committee to clause 18 was to re-write cl 18(6) from its 
original “The Chief High Court Judge may decide any other matters of practice or procedure relating to 
the commercial panel or other panels that are not prescribed or provided for by the High Court Rules.” 
Judicature Modernisation Bill 2013 (178 – 1). 
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(6) A party may nominate that the party’s case be dealt with by a Judge on a 
panel and the Chief High Court Judge may assign to the case a Judge or 
Judges from a panel. 
 
Several features are immediately noteworthy. First, the Bill provides little more than a 
rudimentary or ‘bare bones’ framework. Whilst the commercial panel “is established”, 
its commencement date, and more importantly its scope, will only be determined after 
the Bill is enacted and a subsequent Order in Council is issued.276 As previously 
noted, this is an unfortunate situation as it denies both the public, and MPs, the 
opportunity to scrutinise the panel’s operation to ensure that (a) constitutional 
safeguards remain; and (b) the panel will actually improve New Zealand’s 
commercial litigation ‘problem’. 
 
Secondly, the Bill attempts to reduce executive influence by granting the CHCJ 
significant control over the panel’s operation.277 Thus, once the panel is established, 
the CHCJ has control over both the number, and appointment, of judges to the panel, 
and the subsequent assignment of panel (and non-panel) judges to panel cases.  
 
Finally, clause 18(3) vests the CHCJ with the power to establish non-commercial 
panels, following consultation with the Attorney-General and Chief Justice, thereby 
allowing further specialisation within the High Court.  
 
VIII Issues 
 
Belying its simple construction, clause 18 has the potential to raise several 
constitutional issues. Whilst these concerns are (at present) hypothetical, this does not 
mean that they should be dismissed. Instead, if Parliament continues to progress the 
Bill, clause 18 should be substantially rewritten to reduce the risk of panel packing, 
and its current threat to judicial independence. 
A Judicial independence 
 
A fundamental principle of the rule of law,278 and defining feature of a free society, 279 
judicial independence is necessary for judges to decide without “fear or favour, 
                                               
276 Judicature Modernisation Bill (178 -2), cll 18(1) and (2). 
277  See, for example, (5 December 2013) 695 NZPD 15299 where Judith Collins MP stated that 
“[j]udicial independence will be maintained through judicial control of case allocation and judge 
assignment to the panel.” 
278  Philip A Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (4th ed, Brookers, 
Wellington, 2014) at 797. See also Report of the Royal Commission on the Courts, above n 30, at 
[642].  
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affection or ill will”.280 Although statutes such as the Constitution Act 1986 have 
traditionally focused on the protection of judges from executive or legislative 
influence,281 judicial independence extends beyond separation of powers concerns.  
 
As Simon Shetreet stated “[it] must also encompass internal independence, namely, 
the independence of the judge from his or her judicial colleagues or superiors.”282 
Although this individual independence may be safeguarded in several ways, 283  it 
receives its greatest support from the legislative principle that all High Court judges 
have power over all of the court’s jurisdiction. 284  In line with New Zealand’s 
generalist tradition, this provision ensures equality amongst the judges, providing that 
none shall “rank” higher than another. Clause 18 threatens to undermine this principle 
in three respects.  
1 Judicial hierarchy 
 
First, the practical effect of establishing a commercial panel is a reduction in non-
panel judges’ jurisdiction. Whilst all High Court judges remain competent to 
adjudicate commercial matters, 285  only commercial panel judges will experience 
commercial work. In contrast, under the existing commercial list, list judges preside 
over pre-trial disputes, but the case returns to the general list for its substantive 
hearing (where a non-list judge may be assigned). Assuming that judges enjoy 
working on commercial cases, clause 18 creates a judicial hierarchy whereby “all 
[judges] are equal, but [commercial panel judges] are more equal than others.”286  
 
                                                                                                                                      
279 Geoffrey Palmer and Kim Hill Constitutional Conversations (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 
2002) at 14. 
280 Oaths and Declarations Act 1957, s18. See also Joseph, above n 278, at [20.3]. 
281 Constitution Act 1986, ss 23 and 24. 
282 Shetreet, above n 167, at 3. See also Judges of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeal and High Court 
“Submission to the Justice and Electoral Committee on the Judicature Modernisation Bill” at [6], where 
they argued that: “The independence of judges when judging means that they must also be free of 
interference by other judges. In the High Court, each judge has been appointed to exercise all the 
jurisdiction of the Court. We expressed out concern to the Law Commission that a panel system which 
deprives some judges of part of the jurisdiction is potentially an erosion of the protection of 
independence in judging.” 
283 For example, through random case allocation. See generally Butler, above n 166. 
284 Judicature Act 1908, s 19. See also Judicature Modernisation Bill, cl 8; and Law Commission 2012 
Review of the Judicature Act 1908, above n 34, at [10.8]. 
285 Judicature Act 1908, s 19. See also Judicature Modernisation Bill, cl 8. 
286 A poor adaptation from George Orwell Animal Farm: A Fairy Story (Secker & Warburg, London, 
1954). See also Glazebrook, above n 7, at 549 – 550. 
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It is not difficult to see how this increase in specialisation may, among other things, 
lead to problems surrounding judicial promotion. Faced with a choice between two 
otherwise identical High Court judges, one who has worked solely upon general list 
cases, and another who, in addition to sitting on a specialist commercial panel, has 
been exposed to a wide variety of general list work, the choice will often be clear. 
Taken to an extreme, one may question whether a judge who was not ‘trusted’ to deal 
with High Court commercial cases, can be trusted to sit in the Court of Appeal or 
Supreme Court, where the consequences of an errant decision are far greater.  
 
In many respects, this is of greater concern in New Zealand, than it is in any of the 
other jurisdictions surveyed above (apart from the Cayman Islands) for three reasons. 
First, whereas the New South Wales Supreme Court and England and Wales High 
Court have traditionally sat in divisions, New Zealand’s High Court has always been a 
court of generalists. Thus, because promotions up the judicial hierarchy have always 
taken into consideration the judge’s appointment to particular divisions, the existence 
of specialist lists and courts within these jurisdictions is of less concern than it is in a 
jurisdiction of generalists, such as New Zealand. 
 
Secondly, because judges are assigned to multiple lists/panels in courts such as the 
New South Wales Supreme Court and the FCA, the risk of creating a judicial 
hierarchy is significantly reduced because the judges operate on a level playing field. 
Their specialities may be different, but none is exposed to all of the Court’s work. In 
contrast, the effect of clause 18 is to reduce the non-panel judges’ jurisdiction, whilst 
maintaining panel judges’ ability to sit on all cases. 
 
Finally, unlike the FCA, where judges volunteer to be placed on panels, the fact that 
the CHCJ appoints panel judges under clause 18, could be seen as a promotion within 
the High Court, further undermining the principle that all judges are equal.  
2 Concentration of power 
 
This leads to the second, inter-related concern. In its attempt to remove any hint of 
executive influence over panel membership, the government provided the CHCJ with 
an untrammelled power to appoint judges to the commercial panel.287 Significantly, 
clause 18(4) contains no restrictions on the CHCJ’s powers. Thus, unlike the existing 
                                               
287 See, for example, Judith Collins’ statement during the Bill’s first reading at (5 December 2013) 695 
NZPD 15299; Ministry of Justice Report of the Ministry of Justice to the Justice and Electoral 
Committee (April 2014) at [63]; and Ministry of Justice Judicature Modernisation Bill – Initial Briefing 
(3 March 2014) at [18]. 
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commercial list provisions,288 or many comparable jurisdictions,289 the CHCJ is under 
no obligation to consult with the Chief Justice, nor publish objective guidelines on the 
appointment process.  
 
The risk of impropriety is clear. Where non-panel judges seek promotion to a panel, 
they face a potential incentive to ‘curry favour’ with the CHCJ by ruling in a 
particular manner, or behaving in a particular fashion. 290  To the extent that 
commercial parties and their lawyers recognise the existence of this threat, public 
confidence in the judiciary is likely to be severely undermined. This is exacerbated by 
the fact that the CHCJ is under no obligation to justify panel appointments, meaning 
that any judicial impropriety is unlikely to be discovered or brought to account.  
 
Admittedly, it is highly unlikely that the CHCJ will exercise his or her power 
inappropriately. Nevertheless, this concern only arises because of the government’s 
decision to place the power of appointment solely in the CHCJ’s hands. A more 
sensible approach (in line with the Senior Courts’ Judges’ submission291) would be to 
require the Chief Justice’s concurrence on any appointment. 292  Doing so has the 
advantage of keeping appointments within the Judiciary, thereby removing any hint of 
Executive influence, whilst providing an additional degree of scrutiny and arms-
length appointment. Alternatively, the Bill could provide for judges to apply to be 
placed on these panels, coupled with a strong statement in Parliament that such 
applications should be accepted as a matter of course. 
3 Judicial tenure 
 
Finally, the Bill is silent on the removal of judges from the commercial panel. Nor is 
there any provision regarding the term of a judge’s assignment. The obvious 
inference, therefore, is that the CHCJ’s power to “assign” under clause 18(4), 
encompasses a further ability to reassign or remove judges from the panel.  
 
                                               
288 Judicature Act 1908, s 24C. 
289 For instance, s 6(2) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 (UK) requires the Lord Chief Justice to consult 
with the Lord Chancellor before making appointments to the English Commercial Court, whilst 
appointments to the FSD of the Cayman Islands Grand Court are made by the independent Judicial and 
Legal Services Commission, see Cayman Islands Government, above n 208.  
290 See, for example, Kathy Mack, Sharyn Roach Anleu, and Anne Wallace “Caseload Allocation and 
Special Judicial Skills: Finding the ‘Right Judge’” (2012) 4(3) IJCA 68 at 75. 
291 Judges of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeal and High Court, above n 282, at [6]. 
292 See also the provisions for appointment of commercial list judges under s 24C of the Judicature Act 
1908. 
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Read in this light, clause 18 effectively provides for commercial panel judges to serve 
at the CHCJ’s pleasure. This is a somewhat startling conclusion. As far back as 1700, 
the English Parliament rejected the King’s ability to remove judges without reason.293 
Yet that, in effect, is what clause 18 implies. When considered in light of the CHCJ’s 
already substantial powers of appointment and case management, it becomes 
immediately apparent that too much power has been concentrated in the hands of one 
person.  
 
An appropriate solution would be to adopt the FCA’s approach,294 and appoint panel 
judges for a fixed term of, say, 3 years. Doing so has the advantage of reducing the 
CHCJ’s control over panel judges, whilst also providing a degree of job security not 
currently present in clause 18. 
B Panel packing 
 
In addition to the above concerns, the Bill poses a further threat of judicial 
manipulation or ‘panel packing’. Defined as “the deliberate allocation of one or more 
judges to a judicial panel in order to achieve a particular outcome”;295 panel packing 
compromises the parties’ right to a free and impartial trial, breaches the rule of law, 
and undermines public confidence in the judiciary.296 As such, it poses a significant 
threat to the judicial system, and ought to be actively guarded against. Unfortunately, 
the Bill does the opposite, facilitating judicial manipulation both within and outside 
the commercial panel.  
1 Panel packing within the panel 
Within the panel, threats of judicial manipulation are omnipresent due to the CHCJ’s 
complete control over the allocation of panel cases. Not only does the CHCJ have the 
power to determine the “basis on which cases are to be distributed”,297 but clause 
18(6) expressly provides the CHCJ with the authority to directly assign panel judges 
on a case-by-case basis. To the extent that the CHCJ wishes to influence a result, the 
potential for manipulation is clear. 
 
Unfortunately, as New Zealand’s only real attempt at specialisation reveals, this is not 
an idle concern. Between 1968 and 1991, the vast majority of public law cases 
                                               
293 Act of Settlement 1700 (Eng) 12 & 13 Will III c 2. New Zealand adopted similar provisions in 1858 
with the passage of the Supreme Court Judges Act 1858. For further discussion of this issue see Joseph, 
above n 278, at [21.3.2]. 
294 Law Commission 2012 Issues Paper, above n 32, at [7.60]. 
295 Butler, above n 166, at 85. 
296 Butler, above n 166, at 86 – 87. 
297 Judicature Modernisation Bill, cl 18(5). 
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(approximately 30 per annum) were sent to the High Court’s Administrative Division, 
where they were resolved by judges appointed by the Chief Justice.298 As with clause 
18, the Chief Justice had an unfettered power to allocate judges to panel cases.299 As 
the following table reveals, the resulting distribution of cases leads to substantial 
concerns about the current drafting of clause 18.  
 
Distribution of Administrative Division Cases (1968 – 1987)300 
Judge 
Total number 
of Admin Div. 
cases decided 
Years on the 
Administrative 
Division 
Average number 
of cases per year 
Davison CJ 125 10 12.5 
Speight J 78 13 6 
Wild CJ 75 10 7.5 
White J 28 9 3.1 
Jeffries J 26 6 4.3 
Casey J 25 4 6.3 
McMullin J 25 4 6.3 
Cooke J 20 [less than 1] [more than 20] 
Roper J 20 4 5 
Chilwell J 19 6 3.2 
Wilson J 18 4 4.5 
Grieg J 11 2 5.5 
Holland J 10 3 3.3 
Bisson J 8 6 1.3 
Woodhouse J 7 6 1.2 
Mahon J 5 2 2.5 
Tompkins J 3 2 1.5 
McGregor J 0 1 0 
Doogue J 0 1 0 
Other Judges 53 - - 
Totals 556 93 6 
 
 
Of the 19 judges who were appointed to the Division between 1968 and 1987,301 three 
judges heard and decided “fully half” of the Division’s cases.302 Clearly, judicial case 
allocation was not random, and the Chief Justices’ exerted significant control over the 
                                               
298 Legomsky, above n 270, at 51 – 54. 
299 At the time the Administrative Division operated, the Chief Justice sat predominantly in the High 
Court. In this regard, they occupied a very similar role in relation to the Administrative Division as the 
CHCJ will under the proposed commercial panel. 
300 Table sourced from Legomsky, above n 270, at 62. 
301 Law Commission The Structure of the Courts (NZLC R7, 1989) at [468]. 
302 Legomsky, above n 270, at 60 – 66. See also Law Commission, above n 301, at [430]. 
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Court’s business.303 Furthermore, the fact that both Chief Justices clearly favoured 
themselves when allocating cases shows the undesirability of placing the power of 
distribution in the hands of just one person.304 As Petra Butler correctly observed: 
 
Precisely because the make-up of a court can determine the outcome of a case, it 
is vital for litigants to have confidence that they have not lost a case because of 
decisions made to appoint a particular judge or judges to the case in order to 
produce a particular result.305 
 
This is in stark contrast to the FCA’s strictly random case allocation procedure, or the 
Cayman Islands’ FSD provisions which require the registrar to appoint judges to cases 
randomly (with a requirement to consult the Chief Justice). Ironically, if commercial 
parties or their lawyers observe, suspect, or perceive that panel packing is occurring 
within the commercial panel, threatening their ability to receive a fair and impartial 
trial, they may choose to resolve their dispute in offshore courts or through ADR. In 
this regard, clause 18’s current formulation has the potential to reduce, rather than 
bolster, the number of New Zealand High Court commercial cases. 
2 Manipulation outside the commercial panel 
 
Clause 18 also threatens the provision of justice in non-commercial cases. Because 
panel judges will spend a disproportionately high proportion of their time presiding 
over commercial disputes, the rest of the High Court’s work will be disproportionately 
spread amongst the non-panel judges. 306  Where the CHCJ wished to influence a 
particular area of law, for example sentencing lengths, it would be relatively easy for 
him or her to ‘stack’ the commercial panel with judges who favour tougher sentences. 
The remaining, less penal judges, would then have a greater influence upon 
sentencing policy, helping achieve the CHCJ’s aim of reducing sentencing lengths. 
 
This risk is compounded by the CHCJ’s ability to establish new panels under clause 
18(3), after consulting with the Attorney-General and the Chief Justice. This 
devolution of power represents a puzzling step by Parliament. Whilst it is true that 
courts such as the FCA introduced their specialist lists through Court practice 
directions, it is remarkable that in a generalist system, Parliament would expressly 
provide the CHCJ with the power to create new panels. Indeed, it seems odd that 
                                               
303 Legomsky, above n 270, at 66. 
304 See also Legomsky, above n 270, at 81. 
305 Butler, above n 166, at 84.  
306 The Law Commission stated that they should only spend 50% of their time on panel cases. But this 
was subject to the CHCJ’s discretion: Law Commission 2012 Review of the Judicature Act 1908, above 
n 34, at [10.69]. 
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Parliament granted the Executive control over the commercial panel’s commencement 
date, jurisdiction and termination,307 but is content to allow future panels develop with 
little to no statutory oversight.  
 
Furthermore, the CHCJ’s duty to consult provides only a limited bulwark on his or her 
powers. So long as the CHCJ actually consults with the Attorney-General and Chief 
Justice on his or her plans to create a new panel, there is no obligation to follow their 
advice.308 Accordingly, as the clause currently stands, if the CHCJ wishes to influence 
another area of law, such as judicial review, there is almost nothing to prevent him or 
her from creating a panel to cover that topic, and appointing judges who share a 
similar view of the law in that area. Moreover, unlike the commercial panel, 
Parliament and the Executive have no ability to terminate the newly established panel 
except through new legislation.309 
 
Admittedly, the chances of a CHCJ deliberately assigning judges to the commercial 
panel to influence another area of law, or creating new panels to do just that, is very 
low. However, the consequences of panel packing are aggravated when judicial 
manipulation occurs in the High Court for two reasons. First, because many parties 
will be unwilling to file an appeal due to cost, time or other factors, judicially 
manipulated results will stand, compromising the judiciary’s integrity. Secondly, even 
if an appeal is lodged, this may be of little comfort to affected litigants because 
appellate court judges will generally remain bound by the High Court’s findings of 
fact. 310  Accordingly, it is vital that steps are taken to prevent this non-random 
allocation of cases occurring. 
 
3 Solution 
 
To reduce the current risk of judicial manipulation under clause 18, three significant 
changes need to occur. First, judicial appointment to the panel should be done by the 
CHCJ, with the Chief Justice’s concurrence. Alternatively, the Bill could provide for 
judges to apply for appointment, coupled with a strong statement in Parliament that 
such applications should be accepted as a matter of convention. Secondly, the 
legislation should require commercial panel cases to be assigned randomly to panel 
                                               
307 Judicature Modernisation Bill 2013, cl 18(2). 
308 See, for example, R v Devon County Council, ex p Baker [1995] 1 All ER 73 (CA) at p 85 per Dillon 
LJ; approved by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Lab Tests Auckland Ltd v Auckland District 
Health Board [2008] NZCA 385, [2009] 1 NZLR 776 at [314]. 
309 Compare cl 18(2)(c) with 18(3) of the Judicature Modernisation Bill 2013. 
310 Butler, above n 166, at 86. See also Susan Willett Bird “The Assignment of Cases to Federal District 
Court Judges” (1975) 27 Stan L Rev 475 at 480. 
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judges, unless the CHCJ provides written reasons for allocating a specific judge. 
Thirdly, the CHCJ’s power to create new panels should be limited by the requirement 
to get both the Attorney-General’s and Chief Justice’s approval.  
 
Ideally, however, clause 18 should be removed from the Bill, and made subject to a 
full Law Commission review. 
 
IX Conclusion 
 
This paper does not advocate for, or against, judicial specialisation in New Zealand. 
Instead, it seeks to put the issue in context, so that future reform is conducted in an 
appropriate fashion.  
 
Although judicial specialisation (of different degrees) is prevalent in both large and 
small countries, each jurisdiction has different reasons for its introduction. While the 
FCA is concerned with judicial efficiency, economic justifications and the growth of 
the legal services industry are of primary importance for the SICC and English 
Commercial Court, with both Courts competing to attract litigants from around the 
world. The rationale behind the Cayman Islands’ FSD, on the other hand, lies in 
between these two extremes – it is designed to encourage efficiency, whilst 
maintaining the Islands’ position as a leading financial services destination. 
 
In New Zealand, practitioners’ calls for judicial specialisation have centred on 
commercial litigants’ perceived loss of confidence in the generalist High Court. 
According to the Court’s detractors, commercial parties have become wary of 
generalist High Court judges’ abilities to understand the factual and legal nuances of 
their cases, and increasingly look towards offshore courts and ADR to resolve their 
disputes. The perceived result has been a substantial decline in commercial litigation, 
threatening the development of New Zealand’s commercial law, and potentially 
endangering its economic development, as offshore parties become reluctant to invest, 
and domestic parties face higher transaction costs when negotiating agreements. 
 
Critics argue that moving to a specialist structure will remedy these problems. As 
commercial parties become more willing to entrust their dispute to the courts, New 
Zealand’s law will become more dynamic, enhancing our international legal 
reputation, and encouraging future economic development. 
 
However, as the Law Commission correctly stated, “[i]t would not be sensible for any 
jurisdiction to introduce change into a quality generalist jurisdiction unless the need to 
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do so can be properly demonstrated.”311 This standard simply has not been met. As 
this paper highlights, there is no publically available evidence to support the claim 
that the High Court is losing its commercial jurisdiction. Nor is there any empirical 
data to suggest that commercial litigation is being systematically resolved by ADR or 
in offshore dispute resolution fora. This is a highly unsatisfactory state of affairs. This 
paper strongly argues that there can be no mandate to change a functioning and well-
respected judiciary fundamentally until it can be shown that: 
 
1. relative to historical trends and comparable jurisdictions, the High Court has 
‘lost’ a significant proportion of its commercial jurisdiction (both in terms of 
numbers of cases filed, and types of cases heard and decided);  
2. the ‘lost’ commercial cases are being resolved through ADR or in offshore 
fora; and 
3. the primary reason for litigants’ movement away from the formal civil justice 
system is a lack of judicial specialisation. 
 
Unfortunately, the government’s proposal to introduce a panel system to the High 
Court under clause 18 of the Judicature Modernisation Bill represents a significant 
threat to New Zealand’s legal system. As currently drafted, it endangers a litigant’s 
right to a fair and impartial trial, places too much power in the CHCJ’s hands, and 
threatens to undermine the principle of individual judicial independence.  
 
Whilst the ideal solution would be to remove clause 18 pending a full Law 
Commission review, if the government continues to progress the Bill, Supplementary 
Order Papers should be introduced immediately to: (a) limit the CHCJ’s control over 
the panel by requiring the Chief Justice’s concurrence on all panel appointments; (b) 
provide panel judges with a 3 year tenure; (c) require all cases to be allocated 
randomly amongst panel judges; and (d) limit the CHCJ’s ability to create new panels 
by requiring him or her to get the approval of both the Chief Justice and Attorney-
General. 
 
                                               
311 Law Commission 2012 Review of the Judicature Act 1908, above n 34, at [10.41]. 
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